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Safety performance is driven by leadership in the organization. The leaders translate the 
company’s safety vision into concrete safety actions and procedures in the facilities and 
in daily work. Safety vision is integrated to the Key performance indicators, yet the full 
knowledge of the benefits of safety to the employees and to the company is seldom com-
pletely understood. Company’s safety culture is built on the safe working practices, be-
havior and competence of all employees. HSE statistics shows that still the majority of 
incidents occur as a consequence of unintentional or intentional violations of safe working 
practices and not as a consequence of lacking safety procedures. This underlines the im-
portance of behaviors and attitudes in development of safe working culture. Safety lead-
ership is therefore the key to true Safety culture transformation in the organization. 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a training concept for future Safety leaders and help 
them to enable a sustainable Health, Safety and Environmental cultural transformation of 
safety by choice and not by chance. The main goal of the concept is to develop Safety 
leadership competencies of line managers and create commitment, ownership and ac-
countability across the organization.  The concept harnesses the managers with tools that 
help them to improve the safety performance and safety culture of their facilities and 
provides information and support for leading successful change. The concept builds on 
theoretical framework and case studies. The theoretical framework introduces theories of 
Safety culture, Safety Leadership and Management of Change but also tools to measure 
and analyze safety performance. 
The concept is constructed to two modules for General Managers and HSE managers. 
The first module is for General Managers and includes training on leadership and culture 
change, provides tools to improve safety and supports drafting of the HSE strategic plan. 
The second module is designed for HSE managers and includes training on HSE culture 
and tools to improve it, introduces the challenges managers might face in this culture 
change and discusses the roles and responsibilities HSE managers have in this change. 
This thesis also acts as an additional information of the topic to managers participating in 
the concept. 
ii 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
ROSA TENGVALL: Turvallisuusjohtaminen ja turvallisuuskulttuurin muutoskon-
septin implementointi 
Tampereen teknillinen yliopisto 
Diplomityö, 95 sivua, 0 liitesivua 
Elokuu 2016 
Materiaalitekniikan koulutusohjelma 
Pääaine: Tuotantotalous 
Tarkastaja: professori Jouni Kivistö-Rahnasto 
 
Avainsanat: Turvallisuusjohtaminen, turvallisuuskulttuuri, muutosjohtaminen, tur-
vallisuuden mittaaminen 
 
Yrityksen turvallisuuskulttuuri heijastaa organisaation normeja, perusarvoja, olettamuk-
sia sekä odotuksia, jotka sisältyvät yrityksen toimintaperiaatteisiin. Turvallisuuskulttuu-
riin vaikuttaa erityisesti yrityksen työntekijöiden tapa toimia ja työskennellä, heidän käyt-
täytymisensä sekä pätevyys. Turvallisuusjohtamisella ohjataan yrityksen toimintatapoja 
haluttuun suuntaan. Näin ollen hyvän turvallisuusjohtamisen tärkeimpänä lähtökohtana 
tulisi olla turvallisuuskulttuurin kehittäminen. Johdon sitoutuminen turvallisuuteen hei-
jastuu suoraan henkilöstön sitoutumiseen ja sitä kautta vaikuttaa suoraan yrityksen tur-
vallisuuskulttuuriin. Yrityksen johto on siis avainasemassa kehitettäessä yrityksen turval-
lisuuskulttuuria parempaan suuntaan.  
 
Tämän työn tavoitteena on suunnitella yrityksen turvallisuusjohtajille suunnattu koulu-
tuskonsepti, jonka avulla he saavat ohjattua yrityksen turvallisuuskulttuuria suuntaan, 
jossa turvallinen työskentely kuuluu yrityksen perustoimintaperiaatteisiin. Konseptin 
päätavoitteena on kehittää johtajien turvallisuusjohtamistaitoja ja näin ollen turvata kes-
tävä muutos parempaan yrityksen turvallisuuskulttuurissa. Johtamistaitojen lisäksi kon-
septi esittelee useita työkaluja turvallisuuden mittaamiseen sekä muutoksenhallintaan.  
 
Konseptin suunnittelussa hyödynnetään laajaa teoriakatsausta sekä yrityksen aiempien 
turvallisuuskulttuurin muutosprojektien tuloksia. Koulutuskonsepti rakennetaan kahteen 
eri moduuliin, joista ensimmäinen on suunnattu yrityksen tehtaanjohtajille ja aluejohta-
jille. Tämä moduuli keskittyy turvallisuusjohtamisen kehittämiseen, turvallisuuskulttuu-
rin muutokseen sekä strategian valmisteluun. Toinen moduuli on suunnattu työturvalli-
suusasiantuntijoille. Tämä moduuli painottuu muutosjohtamiseen sekä konkreettisiin työ-
kaluihin, kuinka yrityksen turvallisuutta voidaan mitata, parantaa sekä seurata.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Safety performance is driven by leadership in the organization. The leaders translate the 
company’s safety vision into how safety can actually be executed in the facilities and in 
daily work. Safety vision is integrated to the Key performance indicators, yet the full 
knowledge of the benefits of safety to the employees and to the company is seldom com-
pletely understood. Company’s safety culture is built on the safe working practices, be-
havior and competence of all employees. HSE statistics shows that still the majority of 
incidents occur as a consequence of unintentional or intentional violations of safe working 
practices and not as a consequence of lacking safety procedures. This underlines the im-
portance of behaviors and attitudes in development of safe working culture. Safety lead-
ership is therefore the key to the true Safety culture transformation in the organization. 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a training concept for future Safety leaders and help 
them to enable a sustainable Health, Safety and Environmental cultural transformation of 
safety by choice not by chance. The main goal of the concept is to develop Safety leader-
ship competencies of line managers and create commitment, ownership and accountabil-
ity across the organization.  The concept harnesses managers with tools that help them to 
improve the safety performance of their facilities and provides information and support 
for leaders to manage change. The concept is built on theoretical framework and case 
studies from previous safety improvement projects in the target company. Since the scope 
of this research is in the creation of Safety culture transformation concept, the theoretical 
framework of this study finds solutions for the following themes; 
 How to evaluate Leadership and its influence on safety performance 
 How to assess and measure Safety culture in facilities 
 What kind of tools provide help in Safety culture transformation  
 What is the role of Management of Change in Safety culture transformation 
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In Figure 1 the theories affecting the construction and design of the concept are intro-
duced.  
The main focus in the theoretical part is in the theories of Safety culture, Safety Leader-
ship and Management of Change since they provide the main solutions for concept’s con-
tent. The theoretical background of Safety management and Safety performance meas-
urement and tools are also presented to be able provide the managers the tools to improve 
safety performance and safety culture in their facilities. Main Key performance indicators 
of safety are presented together with common safety processes used in technology com-
panies. The second part of the thesis introduces the target company and the previous 
safety improvement projects executed in the company. The concept development starts 
with analyzing the case studies and creating the requirements for the concept. The re-
quirements of the concept are derived from best practices used in the cases and infor-
mation provided by theoretical framework. 
In the third part, the data from previous safety improvement projects are introduced to 
verify the methods used to improve safety as good practices. The final design and content 
of the concept is presented together with the execution and pilot plan. Importantly the 
content what was incorporated in the concept and why is discussed and evaluated in this 
part. Pilot is designed and executed to get feedback from the participants to further ana-
lyze and improve the concept content and design. The practical and scientific contribution 
of the study is discussed throughout the discussion chapter and the possible improvements 
of the concept introduced in the results.  
Figure 1 Theoretical framework 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The scope of this research is to find applicable theories to support the safety culture trans-
formation in the organization. To be able to understand what is safety, how to manage 
safety and essentially to improve the safety performance in the organization, many theo-
ries must be analyzed and evaluated. The theoretical framework of this study finds solu-
tions for the following themes; 
 How to evaluate Leadership and its influence on safety performance 
 How to assess and measure Safety culture in facilities 
 What kind of tools provide help in Safety culture transformation  
 What is the role of Management of Change in Safety culture transformation 
2.1 Managing safety 
Managing safety is about protecting people, environment and assets but is also a contin-
uous process of safety improvements (Heinrich et al. 1980; Visser 1998). Managing 
safety is based on two different approaches; Safety management and Safety leadership 
(Hämälainen & Anttila 2008). Safety management can be described as the “organized 
efforts and procedures for identifying workplace hazards and reducing accidents and ex-
posure to harmful situations and substances. Safety management also includes training of 
personnel in accident prevention, accident response, emergency preparedness, and use of 
protective clothing and equipment”. (Businessdictionary). Safety leadership on the other 
hand is defined as a process of interaction between leaders and followers, through which 
leaders can exert their influence on followers to achieve organizational safety goals 
(White 2016). Traditionally safety improvement efforts have focused on the engineering 
aspects of safety. Unsafe mechanical or physical conditions are however responsible for 
relatively few accidents (10%) while the most accidents and injuries appears to result 
from employees’ unsafe acts. (Wilpert 1994) Also Pidgeon (1991) states that while hu-
man errors does contribute to accidents, the behavioral causes of failure plays the bigger 
part when causes of the incidents are analyzed. Therefore, managing safety is about mas-
tering the both aspects of Safety management and Safety leadership described in Figure 
2. 
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 In this chapter first Safety management systems are introduced. The theories and prac-
tices of each system is described and the benefits of them argued. The chapter is con-
cluded by evaluating the different aspects of managing safety.  In the second chapter the 
principles and demands of Safety leadership are described. Different leadership models 
and theories are introduced and the effectiveness of these different approaches are stud-
ied. Following questions are answered: How different leadership styles affects the moti-
vation, safety participation and safety compliance of employees? How managers’ engage-
ment to safety reflects the safety performance of employees? Is there a link between safety 
leadership and safety performance?   
2.1.1 Safety Management systems 
Safety management systems are the first key element together with Safety leadership to 
effectively manage safety in organizations. Safety management can be described as the 
“organized efforts and procedures for identifying workplace hazards and reducing acci-
dents and exposure to harmful situations and substances”. (Businessdictionary) Safety 
management system (SMS) is a term used to refer to a comprehensive business manage-
ment system designed to manage safety elements in the workplace. Safety management 
system’s main purpose is to educate and train employees at all levels to understand and 
identify the hazards in the workplace and to control the hazards and associated risks. 
(Crutchfield & Roughton 2014)  
Several industrialized countries introduced in the 1970s a detailed occupational health 
and safety (OHS) regulatory initiatives aiming to dramatically reduce workplace injuries 
and work-related ill health. The OHS strategy proved to be unsuccessful and inefficient 
in reducing workplace injuries since it was mainly passive and fragmented strategy. (Wal-
ters et al. 2002) The strategy where government authorities dictated to employers what 
Figure 2 Approaches for managing safety, adapted from Hämäläinen & Anttila (2008) 
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should be done to reduce workplace injuries was replaced in the 1990s. The new strategy 
promoted manager’s role in occupational health and safety management (OHSM) to re-
duce incidents in the workplace. (Frick and Wren 2000) Since then, several international 
and national level of directives, standards and guidelines for OHSM systems have been 
introduced.  
The OHSMS can be divided to mandatory and voluntary systems. Mandatory OHSMS 
arise from government legislation and dictates the core principles of these systems. One 
example of a mandatory OHSMS is the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC, which obli-
gates the employers to evaluate the risks to the health and safety of employees and also 
implement preventive measures into all of the activities carried out in the organization at 
all hierarchical levels. (EU OHSA 2012) The voluntary OHSMSs are not state-regulated 
and are generally in the form of standards or guidelines. They provide guidance on good 
management practice for OHS and sets the requirements for certification. The standards 
and guidelines can be international for example ILO-OHS 2011, or national e.g. OHSAS 
18001:2007. (EU OHSA 2012) Therefore the framework for organizations’ OHS man-
agement systems comes from mandatory requirements as well as international and na-
tional guidelines as presented Figure 3. (ILO-OHS 2001) 
 
Figure 3 Elements of organization's OHSMS 
One of the most used voluntary international guideline is developed by The International 
Labor Organization (ILO). ILO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that has 
developed its guideline ILO-OHS 2001 for occupational health and safety management 
systems. The guideline builds on five different principles of policy, organizing, planning 
and implementation, evaluation and action for improvement. One example of national 
guideline is The British occupational health and safety management standard OHSAS 
18001 that establishes the formal consensus criteria for OHS management systems. The 
standard reflects the problems of changing an organization and recognizes the importance 
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of planning and managing the changes that are involved in introduction of OHSMS. The 
requirements set in the standard includes general requirements, requirements for plan-
ning, implementation and checking as well as review requirements. These two voluntary 
guidelines are further described in Table 1. 
Table 1 Description of ILO-OSH 2001 and OHSAS 18001 
ILO-OSH 2001 
 
OHSAS 18001 
Policy 
Occupational health and safety policy 
Worker participation 
 
 General requirements 
Establishing an OHSMS for your organization 
 
Organizing 
Responsibility and accountability 
Competence and training 
OHSMS documentation 
Communication 
 
 Planning requirements 
Analysis of OHS hazards and selecting controls 
Legal and non-legal requirements 
OHS objectives and programs 
Planning and implementation 
Initial review 
System planning, development and 
implementation 
OHS objectives 
Hazards prevention 
 Implementation requirements 
Responsibilities and accountability 
Competence and training 
Communication and participation 
OHSMS documentation 
Implementation of control measures 
OHS emergency management process 
 
Evaluation 
Performance monitoring and measurement 
Investigation of injuries, ill health and their 
impact on health and safety performance 
 Checking requirements 
OHS performance monitoring 
Legal compliance 
Incident investigation 
Corrective and preventive actions 
OHS records 
Internal audits 
 
Action for improvement 
Preventive and corrective actions 
Continual improvement 
 Review requirements 
Review of the performance of the OHSMS 
 
The mandatory and voluntary occupational health and safety management system guide-
lines provide the basic outline of safety management but in order to understand what 
makes the OHSMS truly effective, the theories behind these systems needs to be under-
stood. There are many safety management theories that are applied to improve organiza-
tional safety. First, two frequently used theories are presented: the safety management 
system (SMS) theory from Hale et al. (1997) and the resilience engineering theory from 
Hollnagel (2012). According to Moorkamp et al. (2014) these theories can be distinct by 
two paradigms, “minimizing uncertainty” in SMS theory and “coping with uncertainty” 
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in resilience engineering theory. Grote (2012) defines the “minimizing uncertainty” as an 
approach to achieve high level of predictability, standardization and specialization. The 
“coping with uncertainty” approach emphasizes the flexible adaptation to uncertainty by 
providing options for actions rather than fixed plans or standards.  
The safety management systems theory from Hale et al. (1997) can be defined as “mini-
mizing uncertainty” approach since the theory sees safety issues as a result from devia-
tions that have to be removed to ensure stable organizational safety. (Moorkamp et al. 
2014) The theory aims to generate criteria and scenarios for inputs, outputs and resources 
and steer the behavior of the activities to steady-state. This is done by creating a detailed 
description of the production processes and implementing barriers to steer the safety be-
havior and procedures.  Good and efficient SMS according to Hale (2003) includes a clear 
understanding of the company’s primary production processes, structures and related haz-
ards that can lead to significant harm. A life cycle approach that considers how all the 
system elements are designed, purchased, used, maintained and disposed of should be 
used. Also a problem solving cycle is necessary in effective SMS, a cycle that identifies, 
controls and monitors at three levels; at the people in direct control of the risk, at proce-
dures and plans and at a policy level. Feedback and monitoring loops are incorporated 
and the system is linked to staff and line function of the organization. (Hale 2003) 
Another safety management theory is the resilience engineering theory, described as a 
“coping with uncertainty” paradigm since instead of reducing deviations in order to en-
sure stability and safety, the theory emphasizes that it might be impossible to remove all 
the uncertainty in organizations. Therefore the organizations should learn to cope with 
uncertainty in a safe manner. Resilience engineering therefore aims to manage safety by 
accounting the constantly changing nature of dynamic operational conditions and ensures 
the organizations safe adaptation to the conditions. (Moorkamp et al. 2014) In the resili-
ence engineering theory Hollnagel (2012) proposes a functions approach instead of struc-
turing the processes of a company.  The different functions interacts with each other and 
creates resonance. To identify potential sources of resonance effectively and prevent 
safety incidents Hollnagel (2012) argues that functions that are required in every day work 
should be identified and the variables of these functions characterized. The specific state 
of the function should be determined and ways to manage the possible occurrences of 
performance variables proposed.  
Gallagher (1997) combines in his theory the safety management principles and the OHS 
control strategies. Gallagher divides the management styles to traditional and innovative 
management. In traditional management the key persons in health and safety are the su-
pervisor and/or the OHS specialist. Therefore there is a low level of integration between 
the OHS and the broader management system. The employees are not genuinely involved 
in the system and not seen as a critical factor in the OHSMS. In innovative management 
approach the senior and line managers have the key role in health and safety, thus the 
OHS is integrated into the broader management system. Employee involvement is viewed 
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as critical factor effecting the effectiveness of the OHSMS. The control strategies are 
divided to “safe person control strategy” and “safe place control strategy”. In safe person 
control strategy the focus is to control of employee safety behavior on contrary to the safe 
place control strategy where hazard identification, assessments and controls are in focus.  
(Gallagher 1997) The four types of OHSMSs, management styles and OHS controls strat-
egies are illustrated in Figure 4. 
Sophisticated 
behavioural
Adaptive hazard 
managers
Tailored 
engineering and 
design
Unsafe act 
minimisers
Innovative 
management
Safe place 
strategy
Traditional 
management
Safe person 
strategy
 
Figure 4 Gallagher's (1997) typology of OHSMSs 
From these two dimensions of OHS controls strategies and management styles Gallagher 
(1997) identifies four types of OHS management systems; unsafe act minimizers, tradi-
tional engineering and design, adaptive hazards managers and sophisticated behavioral. 
The unsafe act minimizers system is characterized by reactive responses to unsafe acts 
and limitations to employee risk taking. The traditional engineering focuses on safe place 
and traditional management but health and safety consultative arrangements are less im-
portant than in adaptive hazard managers-style. The hazard managers’ approach focuses 
on high level of integration and employee involvement by combining a safe workplace 
strategy and innovative OHS management. The sophisticated behavioral system tries to 
influence the employee behaviors and attitudes and have a high level of employee in-
volvement. This system integrates the OHS and broader management system in high 
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level. Gallagher (1997) studied the effectiveness of these four types of OHSMSs and con-
cluded that organizations adopting the adaptive hazard managers approach then to per-
form better than those adopting other type of OHSMSs.  
Not only the effectiveness of the OHSM system makes safety management effective, also 
management principles plays a key role. According to Wachter and Yorio (2014) the 
presence of a safety management system in organizations is the necessary foundation for 
achieving safe working environment. However, to be able to reach to safety excellence, 
human performance approach and certain management principles should be associated 
with the OHSMS. Many other studies also associate some managerial principles with 
better OHS performance. These key management principles includes workforce empow-
erment, encouragement of long-term commitment, good relations between management 
and employees, the delegation of safety activities and employees decision making, train-
ing and active management role are these essential elements. (Shannon et el. 1997; Gal-
laher et al. 2001; Wachter & Yorio 2014) Wachter and Yorio (2014) studied ten manage-
ment practices and their relationship to safety performance. They found a significant neg-
ative relationship between worker engagement and accident rates and stated that worker 
engagement levels act as mediators between the safety management system and safety 
performance outcomes. The ten key safety management principles are described Table 2. 
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Table 2 Ten safety management principles and system practices, adapted from Wachter 
& Yorio (2014) 
 
Description Safety management system practices 
Employee 
 involvement 
As employee influence over 
safety management system in-
creases they are more likely to 
defend their existence and adopt 
the value of working safely and 
encouraging others to do so.  
Employees are involved in the process of creat-
ing safe work instructions. 
Employees can influence STOP work criteria. 
Employees are involved in devising solutions to 
incidents that resulted from human error. 
Employees are involved in performing safety 
observations of other employees. 
Employees are involved in conducting accident 
investigations. 
Pre- and post-
task safety  
reviews 
When employees perform rou-
tine tasks, they are more likely 
to become complacent and fall 
into the cognitive decision-mak-
ing traps such as  
- anchoring bias (relying pri-
marily on the outcome of previ-
ous task executions) 
- knowledge bias (relying pri-
marily on current knowledge 
and overlooking the safest op-
tions) 
- Optimism bias (the tendency 
to underestimate true risk in-
volved in a task) 
- Overconfidence bias (overesti-
mation of one’s own ability to 
avoid potential harmful out-
comes of a task), and other bi-
ases.  
How often are pre-task safety reviews done?  
When pre-task safety reviews are done, a review 
of critical steps is conducted. 
When pre-task safety reviews are done, the 
worst thing that could happen is discussed.  
After finishing a task, employees participate in 
reviewing the safety aspects of their task. 
Safe  
working 
procedures 
Safe work procedures are devel-
oped to provide the steps neces-
sary to safety execute tasks free 
of injury and illness. They pro-
vide important and consistent 
information to workers of what 
is expected of them from a 
safety perspective.  
Percent of routine tasks that safe work proce-
dures have been developed for. 
Percent of high risk jobs for which hazard anal-
yses have been completed.  
Safe work safe work procedures are reviewed 
and updated when necessary. 
Safety “lessons learned” are considered when 
reviewing and updating safe work procedures. 
Hiring for 
safety 
Selective hiring for safety works 
by hiring employees who are 
less likely to get injured and 
who have an intrinsic value for 
safe work. 
The safety values and beliefs of the organization 
are discussed in the interviews with potential 
employees 
11 
Cooperation  
facilitation 
Safety can be viewed as a per-
sonal and or collective en-
deavor. If work tasks are inter-
dependent, employees need to 
rely on one another for infor-
mation and cooperation to per-
form tasks successfully and 
without incident.  
Employees are encouraged to cooperate with 
each other on resolving safety issues.  
Formal communication mechanisms among co-
workers are robust enough to ensure that infor-
mation being shared covers all necessary safety 
information. 
Formal mechanisms are utilized to ensure that 
key safety information is communicated be-
tween off-going and on-coming shifts 
Safety training Safety training is a fundamental 
safety practice emphasized by 
most national safety and health 
legislative bodies. Safety train-
ing works by increasing 
knowledge and awareness of 
safety and health in the work-
place. 
Employees are formally trained on the safety as-
pects of their job 
Employee safety training incorporates elements 
of hazard recognition and avoidance. 
Communication Communication and infor-
mation sharing is tied to the fre-
quency and methods of empha-
sizing knowledge and the im-
portance of safe work. 
Employees are informed of new or revised 
safety rules and safe work instructions 
Employees are informed about potential hazards 
in the workplace or their tasks 
Information about the importance of working 
safely is communicated to employees 
Employees are informed about safety incidents 
experienced in other similar organizations 
When safety incidents do occur, the results of 
the investigation are shared among the work-
force. 
Accident  
investigation 
When safety incidents occurs, 
organizations can investigate 
those accidents with the ulti-
mate goal of reducing the proba-
bility of the event occurring 
again 
Incident investigations seek to uncover root 
causes 
Accident investigations are conducted by a team 
of individuals consisting of employee repre-
sentative(s), a safety representative, and the in-
jured employee’s immediate supervisor. 
Detection and 
monitoring 
Organizations can create and 
utilize checklists used by super-
visors and other employees to 
detect situations and behaviors 
that may not be in line with the 
safety rules and requirements in 
place 
Safety checklists have been developed corre-
sponding to possible workplace hazardous con-
ditions and risk behavior 
Safe work instruction deviations result in nega-
tive consequences for employees 
Deviations from safe work instructions are 
tracked and monitored. 
Safe-task  
assignment 
Organizations may take into ac-
count how well suited an em-
ployee is for a particular task in 
order to maximize the likeli-
hood that the task will be exe-
cuted successfully without inci-
dent.  
Supervisors are provided with the flexibility to 
assign the right employee to the task 
When flexibility is allowed, the risk associated 
with stress, fatigue or distraction is considered. 
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Legislation, mandatory and voluntary OHSM systems, different OHS control strategies 
and management principles set the framework for organizations’ safety management sys-
tems. The benefits of these systems have been discussed previously but one important 
factor still has to be taken into account in order to create an effective OHSMS. According 
to Drais et al. (2002) the benefits of an OHSMS in terms of OHS outcomes depends less 
on guidelines or standards followed to implement the OHSMS, and more on the manner 
in which they are implemented. The study showed that the implementation of OHSMS is 
highly determined by the organizations’ structure, size, activity and technology but also 
by the objectives of the organization. The successful implementation therefore depends 
on the type of control that organization has e.g. central versus local control and the man-
agement practices the organization uses. The OHS management therefore doesn’t follow 
a model but four different tendencies; cascade, innovative, applied and ideological. These 
four approaches to implementation of OHSMS are described in Table 3 with aspects of 
decision flow, goals of different approaches and the roles and responsibilities in each 
OHSMSs. (EU OHSA 2012; Drais 2002) 
Table 3 Implementation of OHSMS, different approaches, adapted from Drais et al. 
(2002) 
 
Cascade Innovative Applied Ideological 
Origin of  
decision 
Senior manage-
ment  
Supervisory level 
management 
HSE department Senior manage-
ment 
Expected goal Integration of 
OHS into local 
policies 
Integration of 
OHS into prac-
tices 
Formalization of 
OHS manage-
ment 
Integration of 
OHS into indi-
viduals behavior 
Leaders and 
partners 
National man-
agement and 
safety line man-
agers 
Supervisory level 
management and 
staff together 
with safety line 
managers 
Supervisory level 
management and 
safety line man-
agers 
Senior and su-
pervisory level 
management 
Method of im-
plementation 
Information and 
awareness-rais-
ing meetings 
Working groups 
with staff 
Supervisory level 
management 
meetings 
Human resources 
and individual 
assessment 
Resources Limited Negotiable Limited Extensive 
Employee in-
volvement 
Low High to start with Limited High at the end 
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Cascade approach refers to the OHS policy developed by senior management for imple-
mentation across the group. The approach includes overarching safety measures and re-
sponsibilities that are distributed throughout the hierarchy. This approach is perceived as 
a bureaucratic amongst employees, and is often implemented in a merely formal fashion. 
The study shows that this approach delivers minimal benefits for the safety and health of 
workers. Innovative approach is an opportunity to rethink the organization’s activities 
and responsibilities to genuinely integrate OHS into broader management system. The 
organizations want to have a well-defined OHS policy but analyses afresh the definition 
and organization of health and safety-related aspects. The risk in this approach is the loss 
of momentum if management support declines. Third approach is the applied approach, 
where safety line managers apply the safety guidelines to organization with help of effec-
tive risk analysis. The drawback of this approach is that the safety approach will remain 
only as a technical process and have little impact on the working practices and safety 
behaviors of employees. The fourth approach is ideological, where organizations aware-
ness of OHS issues is driven by moral values as opposed to managerial or technical con-
siderations. The focus is on employee empowerment and changing their attitudes and 
uniting them along a common safety culture. (EU OHSA 2012; Drais 2002) 
Summing up this chapter, the effective implementation of the OHSMS requires both sys-
tem associated approach and different management principles. Defining the OHS policy 
sets the framework for the safety management system. The policy must be driven by sen-
ior executives’ a genuine desire to make the organization safer. The policy should include 
defined objectives that are consistent with other organizational policies, determined man-
agement responsibilities, resources, plans for employee engagement and required guide-
lines for the OHS management system. The policy should also state the indicators how 
safety performance is measured and how the performance is reported. The OHS roles and 
responsibilities in delivering the policy must be specified to enhance ownership. Contin-
uous improvement of the process is essential to improve the safety performance in organ-
izations. Risk assessment is one of the key elements in continuous improvement and also 
enhances the employee involvement in safety. Last but not least, in effective safety man-
agement the leading and lagging OHS indicators should be used to measure, monitor, 
audit and review of the OHS management system. (EU OHSA 2012) 
2.1.2 Principles and demands of Safety Leadership 
Safety leadership is the second element in managing safety and often not that clearly un-
derstood as the safety management. Safety leadership is defined as a process of interaction 
between leaders and followers, through which leaders can exert their influence on follow-
ers to achieve organizational safety goals (White 2016). Safety leadership is a key factor 
in promoting safety performance in organizations (Bass 1985; Barling 2002; Tappura 
2014; Kapp 2012). Many studies have stated that safety leadership not only promotes 
safety participation and safety compliance of employees but also has a positive effect to 
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the productivity in organizations (Kapp 2012; Lewis 2009, Tappura et al. 2013; Hale 
2010). The definition for Safety leadership is previously described but in order to fully 
understand the terminology and their correlation to each other the terms safety perfor-
mance, safety compliance and safety participation is defined next. Safety performance is 
the concept of safety-related actions and behaviors that workers exhibit in almost all kinds 
of work in order to promote the safety and health of themselves or others (Burke et al. 
2010). Safety related behavior includes a range of activities performed by individuals to 
maintain a safe working place and is divided to two dimensions by Griffin and Neal 
(2000),  the task dimension of safety compliance and the contextual dimension of safety 
participation. Safety compliance refers to the essential activities that must be performed 
in order to maintain safety in workplace. It includes the adherence to requirements defined 
in standards, policies and procedures and therefore refers to the behavior which is about 
engaging people in core safety tasks. Safety participation on the other hand refers to the 
employee’s voluntary participation in safety activities, which aims to contribute to the 
development of a supportive safety environment. (Griffin & Neal 2000) 
The practical and academic interest in leadership styles and employee safety related be-
havior in literature is extensive. However, what comes to Safety leadership and leadership 
in its entirety the most comprehensive and well tested model of leadership styles is the 
full range leadership model by Bass and Avolio (1994). (Kirkbride 2006) The full range 
leadership model depicts the whole range of leadership styles from passive and ineffective 
non-leadership to effective and active transformational styles as described in Figure 5. 
Transactional leadership focuses on establishing goals and actively monitoring the em-
ployee’s performance towards these goals. Transactional leadership also provides correc-
tive feedback and rewarding system to employees to sustain and improve performance 
(Bass 1985, Kapp 2012). Transformational leadership relies upon the leader motivating 
employees to perform beyond their self-interest towards the greater good (Barling et al. 
2002). According to Bass (1985) transformational leadership achieves results through 
raising followers acceptance of some goals, thus altering the followers need level on 
Maslow’s hierarchy for accomplishing that goal.  
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Passive
Effective
Active
Ineffective
Laissez-Faire
Management by 
exception
Contingent Reward
Individualized 
Consideration
Intellectual stimulation
Inspirational motivation
Idealized influence
Transformational
Transactional
Nonleadership
 
Figure 5 Full range leadership model, adapted from Bass & Avolio (1994) 
Full range leadership model divides the three leadership styles; Nonleadership, transac-
tional and transformational leadership to seven different approaches seen in Figure 5.  
Starting with the nonleaderhip style, laissez faire-leader is essentially a non-leader. This 
type of manager offers little in terms of direction or support and is often “absent” to the 
needs of their followers.  The manager avoids making decisions, abdicates responsibili-
ties, refuses to take sides in dispute and shows lack of interest in what is going on. (Kirk-
bride 2006, Bass & Avolio 1994) The transactional leadership style is divided to two 
different approaches which are management by exception and contingent reward. Man-
agement by exception can be seen as active or passive management. Passive management 
by exception focuses to the deviations from standard. This type of manager takes action 
only when problem occurs and tends to be relatively laissez-faire under the normal cir-
cumstances. The manager enforces corrective actions when mistakes are made and places 
energy on maintaining status quo. Thus the manager has a wide performance acceptance 
range and poor performance monitoring systems. However, management by exception 
can also be active. Active leader pays very close attention to any problems or deviations 
and teaches followers how to correct mistakes. Therefore the active management by ex-
ception has an accurate monitoring and control system to provide early warnings of prob-
lems but still even as done well the style tends to provide only moderate performance. 
(Kirkbride 2006, Bass & Avolio 1994) 
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Contingent reward is the classical transactional leadership style where the leader sets clear 
goals, objectives and targets and clarifies what rewards can be expected from successful 
completion. This type of leader recognizes what needs to be accomplished and follows 
up the performance. This type of leader provides support and resources to meet the ob-
jectives and gives recognition to followers when they perform and meet the goals. The 
rewards may not only be financial but also a wide range of non-financial rewards like 
time off, holidays, praise or visible recognition. If done successfully, this leadership style 
produces performance at required levels. (Kirkbride 2006, Bass & Avolio 1994) How-
ever, in order to get the employees to “walk that extra mile” transformational leadership 
styles are a necessity. Transformational leaders are intellectually stimulating, directing 
followers to look at the things from new perspectives. (Hetland et al. 2011) They recog-
nizes the followers’ individual needs and abilities and therefore stimulates their intellec-
tual development. Transformational leaders also exert influence on their followers by 
communicating an idealistic vision of the future. (Bass 1985) Transformational leadership 
styles employs four components, individual consideration, intellectual stimulation, inspi-
rational motivation and idealized influence. 
Individual consideration is the first of the transformational leadership styles. These type 
of leaders recognize differences among their follower, their strengths and weaknesses, 
likes and dislikes. Thus the leader assigns projects to followers based on their individual 
abilities and needs. The leader also demonstrates concern for the followers and encour-
ages to two-way exchange of views and ideas. The second style of transformational lead-
ership is intellectual stimulation involves the leader to stimulate the followers to think 
through the issues and encourages to question the possible problems and their solutions. 
The leader re-examines assumptions, is willing to put forward also ideas that seem foolish 
at first and creates a readiness for changes in thinking. (Kirkbride 2006, Bass & Avolio 
1994) The third style of transformational leadership is the inspirational motivation where 
the leader challenges and inspires the subordinates to go beyond their personal interests 
and focuses their attention on the goals of the collective. The leader has the ability to 
motivate the followers to superior performance by articulating a vision of the future in an 
exciting and compelling manner. The inspirational leader mounds expectations and 
shapes meanings, reduces complex matter to key issues using simple language and creates 
a sense of priorities and purpose. (Kapp 2012) 
The final transformational leadership style refers to the leaders that have become an ide-
alized influence or in other words a role model to people around them. The leaders exhibit 
certain personal characteristics or charisma and demonstrate certain moral behaviors. The 
attributes of this type of a leader are that the leader demonstrates unusual competence, 
uses power for positive gain and celebrates genuinely followers’ achievements. (Kirk-
bride 2006) The leader has an enhanced, two-way interaction with followers (Hale 2010). 
Idealized influence can also be seen in safety related activities since the leader has an 
elevated commitment to safety and he emphasizes the importance of safety with words 
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and actions (Hale & Hovden 1998; Shannon et al. 1997). The different leadership styles 
are gathered in Table 4 with description of the styles and examples from the research 
literature.  
Table 4 Leadership styles and examples from research, adapted from Tappura et al. 
(2014) 
 
Description Examples from research 
Management by 
exception 
Passive management focuses 
to the deviations from  
standard 
 
Active leader pays very close 
attention to any problems or 
deviations 
Monitoring safety of working practices  
(Griffin 2013; Shannon 1997; Zohar 2002) 
Enforcing and teaching corrective actions  
(Lu 2010) 
Sanctions for violating safety standards  
(Hale & Hovden 1998)  
Contingent  
reward 
Leader sets clear goals, ob-
jectives and targets and  
follows up performance 
Following performance (Bass & Avolio 1994) 
Providing support and resources (Bass 1985) 
Rewarding and giving feedback to followers  
(Hale & Hovden 1998; Zohar 2002) 
Individual  
consideration 
Leaders recognize differences 
among followers 
Assigning projects to followers based on their in-
dividual abilities (Bass & Avolio 1994; Hale & 
Hovden 1998)  
Culture of caring (Hale & Hovden 1998) 
Redesigning work e.g. after employees accident 
(Shannon et al. 1997) 
Enhancing two-way exchange of views and ideas 
(Bass & Avolio 1994; Kirkbride 2006) 
Intellectual 
stimulation 
Leader stimulates followers 
to think through the issues, 
supports ideas and problem 
solving   
Creating readiness for changes in thinking  
(Bass & Avolio 1994) 
Motivating problem solving and learning  
(Hale & Hovden 1998; Griffin 2013) 
Distributing safety roles and responsibilities 
(Shannon et al. 1997) 
Inspirational 
motivation 
Leader challenges and in-
spires followers to go beyond 
their personal interests to-
wards a collective goal 
Motivating followers to superior performance 
(Kapp 2012) 
Articulating a compelling vision of the future 
(Kapp 2012; Bass & Avolio 1994) 
Creating a sense of priorities and purpose 
 (Bass & Avolio 1994, Kirkbride 2006) 
Idealized  
influence 
Leader as a role model to fol-
lowers 
Enhanced interaction with followers (Hale 2010) 
Emphasizing the importance of safety  
(Hale & Hovden 1998) 
Elevated commitment to safety 
(Shannon et al. 1997) 
Celebrating followers’ achievements  
(Kirkbride 2006) 
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Based on the study of Tappura et al. (2014) all the traditional leadership facets of trans-
actional and transformational leadership are relevant to safety leadership. Also several 
other studies suggest that both transformational and transactional leadership is a suitable 
construct for safety leadership (e.g. Barling et al. 2002, Kapp 2012, Clarke 2013). The 
study of Clarke (2013) indicates that active transactional leadership is important in ensur-
ing safety compliance with rules and regulations, whereas transformational leadership is 
associated with enhanced safety participation. Transactional leadership not only ensures 
safety compliance but also shapes employees’ perceptions of the importance of safety. 
Zohar (2002) states that transactional leadership, more precisely contingent reward has 
beneficial effects on safety outcomes, leading to fewer injuries. Another transactional 
leadership style, the passive management by exception leadership has demonstrated neg-
ative effects on workplace safety and thus reduced safety compliance and participation. 
(Mullen 2011) 
Barling et al. (2002) argues that a safety specific transformational leadership can affect 
the subordinates’ awareness of safety issues at workplace as well as their perception of 
organizations’ policy and practices concerning safety. This was seen to lead to less safety 
related incidents. Also Mullen and Kelloway (2009) stated that this type of safety-specific 
transformational leadership improved safety outcomes and enhanced the safety participa-
tion of employees. Therefore the study shows the link between transformational leader-
ship and enhanced safety performance.  Judge and Piccolo’s (2004) study shows that 
transformational leadership is also positively correlated to followers’ job satisfaction and 
motivation. Many other researchers links the transformational leadership to enhanced em-
ployee engagement, organizational commitment and proactive behavior. (Griffin 2013; 
Xu et al. 2011, Lee 2005) 
Griffin (2010) further studied the impact of specific leader behaviors on employee’s 
safety performance. He examined how the leader behaviors of safety inspiring, safety 
monitoring and safety learning impacted the safety compliance and safety participation 
of employees. These leadership behaviors can be grouped to transformational and trans-
actional leadership styles. The safety inspiring, as a transformational leadership style re-
fers to the degree to which leader presents a positive vision of safety that is appealing and 
inspiring to the employees. The safety monitoring, a transactional style refers to the de-
gree on which the leader monitors and responds to mistakes in relation to safety. Safety 
learning is the behavior where the leader encourages and promotes safety related learning. 
The study of Griffin (2010) shows that safety inspiring is specifically related to safety 
participation whereas safety monitoring and safety learning relates to safety compliance 
showed in Figure 6. 
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Safety monitoring
Safety learning
Safety participation
Safety compliance
Transformational
Transactional
 
Figure 6 Link between safety inspiring, safety monitoring and safety learning in pre-
dicting safety performance, adapted from Griffin (2010) 
Clarke (2013) also studied the link between leadership styles and safety performance but 
took also into account the safety climate factor. Safety climate can be defined as employ-
ees’ perceptions of the relative priority of safety in relation to other organizational goals. 
(Zohar 2000) Safety climate can also be seen as an individual-level construct, where per-
ceived safety climate represents individuals’ perceptions of policies, procedures and prac-
tices relating to safety in the workplace. (Clarke 2013) The safety climate and safety cul-
ture is covered in more detail in chapter 2.2. The study from Clarke (2013) showed that 
transformational leadership had a positive association with both perceived safety climate 
and safety participation of employees. Active transactional leadership on the other hand 
had a positive association with perceived safety climate and safety compliance. The link 
between transformational leadership and safety compliance as well as the link between 
active transactional leadership and safety participation were non-significant. The model 
from Clarke (2013) is presented in Figure 7. 
Transformational 
leadership
Active transactional 
leadership
Safety climate
Safety participation
Safety compliance
Safety performance
 
Figure 7 Relationship between leadership, safety climate and safety, adapted from 
Clarke (2013) 
It can be argued that an effective safety leadership should incorporate the principles of 
both transformational and transactional leadership styles. (Bass & Avolio 2003; Barling 
et al. 2002; Kapp 2012; Clarke 2013; Griffin 2013; Tappura et al. 2014; Wu et al. 2008) 
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Effective safety leadership is not only the sum of transformational and transactional lead-
ership styles but also depends on the credibility and vision of managers as well as their 
safety commitment. Credibility of management depends on the employees trust in man-
agement. The importance of employees’ trust in management for workplace safety has 
received increasing attention within the literature. (Conchie et al. 2013; Conchie & Don-
ald 2009; Zohar 2000) These studies show that trust in management increases employees’ 
engagement in safety behaviors and therefore reduces rates of accidents. Conchie and 
Donald (2009) stated that the qualities like honesty, openness and concern for others’ 
safety and welfare are the key factors of employees’ trust in management.  
Krause and Bell (2015) argue that consistency between manager’s words and actions 
plays the key role in the management credibility. Credibility of the manager can be en-
hanced via honest feedback. According to Cavazotte et al. (2013) one significant factor 
that also affects the safety performance of employees seems to be the feedback provided 
by leaders. Survey of literature performed by Bass (2008) suggest that the feedback from 
the supervisor about the performance of his subordinates is a driving stimulus and im-
portant factor for improving safety performance. Several other studies also shows that 
positive feedbacks increase the prevalence of safety behavior and even improves the skills 
and motivation of employees regarding safety (Blackmon 1995; Cavazotte et al. 2013; 
Bass 2008) 
Neal and Griffin (2004) defines the management’s safety commitment as the extent to 
which management is perceived to place a high priority on safety and communicate and 
act on safety issues effectively. Many studies show that the senior management’s safety 
commitment has a crucial influence on organizational safety (Fruhen et al. 2014; Michael 
et al 2005; Christian et al. 2009; Krause & Bell 2015) Studies show that safety commit-
ment is reflected from five aspects of management actions. These aspects are managers’ 
decision- and policy making, their involvement and communication with workforce and 
safety values. (Zohar 2005; O’Toole 2002; Griffin & Neal 2004) The study of Fruhen et 
al. (2014) indicated that also two other factors affects positively on the perception of the 
management’s safety commitment; the managements’ ability to understand and solve 
safety related problems and the managements’ social perception, the ability to understand 
the emotions of others. The safety knowledge on the other hand was not associated with 
behavior that demonstrates safety commitment of management. Zohar (1980) argued that 
the management commitment can manifest itself through such things as job training pro-
grams, participation in safety committees and taking safety in consideration in job design. 
Since the safety commitment of managers plays the key role in organizational safety, 
what can then hinder the engagement of managers to safety and safety leadership? Ac-
cording to Conchie et.al (2013) both individual factors and contextual factors influences 
the engagement in leadership. Two individual factors such as personality and emotional 
intelligence are seen important antecedents of engagement (Barling et al. 2000) but the 
contextual factors are no less important since research suggests that these factors may 
21 
account for between 41% and 70% of variance in leadership behaviors. (Arvey et al. 
2006) Contextual factors can be considered as either demands that deplete the manager’s 
energy and consequently engagement in safety leadership, or as resources that facilitate 
manager’s engagement. Job demands refers to the physical, social, or organizational as-
pects of job that require sustained mental or physical effort from a person. Job resources 
on the other hand refers to the physical, social and organizational aspects of a job that aid 
in the completion of tasks, reduce the negative consequences of job and contributes to 
personal growth. (Conchie et al. 2013)  
The study of Conchie et al. (2013) concludes that work overload, production demands, 
formal procedures and some workforce characteristics hindered supervisor’s engagement 
in safety leadership. Work overload has been associated with reduced safety citizenship 
behaviors and an increase in unsafe behavior also in other research. (Barling et al. 2002; 
Nahrgang et al. 2011) The study of Conchie et al. (2013) suggests that reducing demands 
placed on supervisors in one way for organization to promote supervisors’ safety leader-
ship. Also the negative effect of job demands can be decreased by offering a training in 
supervisory role. Supervisors’ engagement in safety leadership is enhanced through social 
support from organization and co-workers and through perceived autonomy. Perceived 
autonomy refers to the sense of independence while carrying out a task and encourages 
ownership of the task. Engagement also comes from the understanding of safety leader-
ship and the different leadership styles. According to Kirkbride (2006) managers should 
understand that they don’t have to be “perfect” leaders, instead all that is required is a 
subtle change of balance from the transactional leadership style towards transformational 
style via coaching, training and support from the organization. 
2.2 Safety culture 
Organizational culture is a concept used to describe the organizational values that affect 
and influence members’ attitudes and behaviors. Safety culture is often described as a 
sub-facet of organizational culture, which affects the member’s attitudes and behaviors 
in relation to organization’s ongoing health and safety performance. (Cooper 2000) Ac-
cording to Cullen (1990) Safety culture is used to describe the corporate atmosphere or 
culture in which safety is understood to be, and is accepted, as the number one priority. 
Cullen argues that unless safety is the dominating characteristic of organizational culture 
then the safety culture can be seen as sub-component of organizational culture, which 
alludes to individual, job and organizational features that affect and influence health and 
safety. Turner et al. (1989) defined Safety culture as “the set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, 
roles, and social and technical practices that are concerned with minimizing the exposure 
of employees, managers, customers and members of the public to conditions considered 
dangerous or injurious.” Another often used definition for Safety culture comes from The 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI 1991) that defines safety culture as “the ideas and 
beliefs that all members of the organization share about risk, accidents and ill health”. 
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According to Cullen (1990) the definitions of Safety culture reflect the view that safety 
culture ‘is’ something in the organization rather that something that the organization 
‘has’.  
Another closely related concept to organizational culture and safety culture is the safety 
climate. Safety climate is generally accepted term to describe the collective view of Safety 
within an organization that is manifested by recent or current events. According to Zohar 
(1980) and Cooper (2000) safety climate is therefore the accumulation of beliefs, values, 
and perceptions about safety that are shared within a specific group. In contrast to safety 
culture, safety climate is often significantly influenced by recent events and can be con-
sidered as a ‘snap-shot’ of the organization’s safety culture. (Cooper 2000, Flin et al. 
2000, Hale 2000) For example, the safety climate of an organization can experience an 
immediate negative impact if a major workplace incident such as a serious injury occurs.  
Although this event may eventually also impact the safety culture, it tends to have a sig-
nificant latency and it requires years to accurately evaluate the impact. (Goulart 2013) In 
this chapter first the different methods to assess the safety culture are introduced, followed 
by an introduction to different models of safety culture.  Since the concepts of safety 
culture and safety climate are closely related, in this thesis the term safety culture refers 
later on to a combination of both safety culture and safety climate.  
2.2.1 Assessment of Safety culture 
The need to assess organization’s safety culture can derive from many different sources. 
Safety culture assessment can be done after a serious incident to get a better understanding 
of the true causes behind the incident. On the other hand, safety culture assessment can 
form the base for normal organizational improvement or be performed according to the 
orders from authorities. The methods for assessing safety culture can be divided to two 
categories, quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative methods focus on the com-
parison of the safety culture to some scale. Typically quantitative methods are preferred 
since they are easy to perform and the data is comparable. Examples of quantitative meth-
ods are audits or questionnaires. Qualitative methods can be also used to assess safety 
culture. In qualitative methods the question forming is more descriptive, seeking answers 
to questions like “what kind of safety culture do we have” or “why our safety culture is 
what it is”. Examples of qualitative methods are interviews, workshops and observation. 
The quantitative and qualitative methods generate different kind of information thus both 
of them should be used when assessing safety culture since the information gain from 
these methods usually completes one another. Quantitative methods are suitable when the 
culture development and trend are under examination. Qualitative methods can act as a 
base for improvement projects since they provide more profound information of the actual 
causes behind the state of the safety culture. (Reiman & Pietikäinen 2008) 
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Most used assessment method is the quantitative questionnaire since it is easy to use and 
to perform. (Clarke 2000; Glendon & Stanton 2000) Usually questionnaires are per-
formed anonymously since it ensures that the answers are truthful and describe the actual 
state of the safety culture. The questionnaires assess the different cultural dimensions of 
the organization by gathering answers to different statements. Usually the statements are 
answered on a Likert-scale, which goes from “I disagree” to “I agree”.  (Reiman & Pie-
tikäinen 2008) The answers and parameters gain from the questionnaire can be used to 
assess the level, strength and scope of the organization’s safety culture. According to 
Zohar (2007) the level of safety culture describes how safety is prioritized in the organi-
zation and reveals whether the safety culture is good or bad. The strength describes the 
unanimity of the employees on how they perceive the safety culture. The scope of the 
safety culture shows whether there are large differences between the perception of safety 
culture’s level or strength.  
Even though questionnaires are most used assessment method to assess the safety culture 
they are also criticized. Questionnaires are argued to only show the surface of the culture, 
the safety climate that is affected by resent events. (Glendon & Stanton 2000) However, 
even if the results are only a snap-shot of the safety culture, they have an important prac-
tical use. Organizations can use the results to compare e.g. the safety culture in different 
facilities. The comparison helps the organization to see the strengths of different facilities 
and also the improvement areas where safety can be further developed (Sorra 2007). 
Glendon (2001) introduced a large set of safety culture questions that comprises of six 
factors. The factors are introduced and further discussed in chapter 2.2.2. but some ex-
amples of the questions are introduced below: 
 Safety rules are followed even when a job is rushed 
 Safety rules can be followed without conflicting with work practices 
 Workers can express their views about work problems 
 Workers are spoken when changes in working practices are suggested 
 Work problems are openly discussed between workers and supervision 
Another quantitative method, safety audit can be used together with questionnaires. In the 
safety audits organization’s processes are assessed usually with checklists. The aim of the 
audit is to find out whether the organization has the ability and intention to work safely. 
The resources, work instructions and safety management system amongst others can be 
assessed and some conclusion of the safety culture can be made on a certain extent. 
(Reiman & Pietikäinen 2008) However, according to Lee (1998) safety audits are more 
of a self-assessment of leaders and therefore Lee emphasizes the need for supporting 
questionnaires where the employee’s voice can also be heard. Observation is also used as 
a quantitative method to assess safety culture. First the wanted safety behavior is de-
scribed, evaluated and scored. (Cooper 2000; Zohar 2007) Then the employees are ob-
served to notice the deviations in working behavior. The problem of this method is that it 
is rather concise. For example if employees are observed to walk without a helmet the 
24 
conclusion that the employee does not understand the meaning of safety and the risks in 
his work cannot be made directly. (Reiman & Pietikäinen 2008) 
Another way to assess the safety culture is to use qualitative methods. Instead of ques-
tionnaires or audits organization can perform interviews to a smaller group of employees. 
It is important to allocate the interviews correctly and select the people for interviews so 
that they are a descriptive subset of a larger group of employees. Interviews can be per-
formed in two different ways. The interviewee can be asked to describe the safety matter 
to a person unfamiliar with the subject. Another way is to ask work content related ques-
tions, thus the context understanding of the employee is emphasized.  The organization 
can also use group work methods. In the workshop people from different operations of 
the organization can be asked to discuss about safety issues and perform evaluation where 
improvements could be made. (Mengolini & Debarberis 2007; Reiman & Pietikäinen 
2008)  
2.2.2 Models for Safety culture 
A number of attempts have been made in recent years to map or describe the main features 
of safety culture. Different models describe the safety culture as a derivative of different 
factors or dimensions. In a study from Reiman and Pietikäinen (2008) over 25 studies of 
safety culture are introduced and described. This emphasizes the amount of interest from 
researches to this theme but also states the variability of the perspectives what researches 
have on safety culture. In this thesis three models are introduced in order to present a 
basic outlook to the subject; Cooper’s reciprocal safety culture model, IAEA’s model and 
the model from Reiman and Pietikäinen that resulted from an extensive literature re-
search.  
Cooper’s model (2000) forms the basic theory in understanding safety culture. Cooper’s 
reciprocal safety culture model contains three elements which encompass subjective in-
ternal psychological factors, observable ongoing safety-related behaviors and objective 
situational features presented in Figure 8. In this model for example the management en-
gagement to safety can be seen in psychological level as the manager’s personal appreci-
ation and engagement to safety. In behavioral level the engagement appears as concrete 
actions and the way the manager talks about safety. In situational level the safety engage-
ment can be seen in safety management system elements, work instructions or process 
descriptions. (Reiman & Pietikäinen 2008) The three different factors can be evaluated 
with quantitative and qualitative assessment methods. The internal psychological factors 
can be assessed with safety related questionnaires, the behavioral factors with observation 
and checklists. Audits can be used to assess the situational features like safety manage-
ment system elements. (Cooper 2000) 
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Figure 8 Cooper's reciprocal safety culture model, adapted from Cooper (2000) 
Another safety culture model from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is 
widely used as common understanding and assessment of safety culture within nuclear 
power facilities. Although IAEA’s role is purely advisory, its model of safety culture is 
becoming a reference for regulatory bodies. (López de Castro et al. 2012) The safety cul-
ture model of IAEA is composed of 37 attributes clustered into five dimensions. These 
five dimensions are “safety is clearly recognized value, Leadership for safety is clear, 
Accountability for safety is clear, Safety is integrated into all activities and Safety is learn-
ing driven”. The attributes of these five dimensions characterizes the strong safety culture 
and are created in a form of a short description of the dimension. Safety culture of the 
organization can be assessed with the help of this model since the attributes covered in 
this model should also be covered when developing interview questions or questionnaires. 
(IAEA 2006) Even though the safety culture model of IAEA is widely accepted, some 
caution should be used when deciding whether to use this model as a reference for organ-
ization’s safety culture. López de Castro et al. (2012) studied the validity of the IAEA’s 
safety culture model and concluded that “the five dimensions of the model may appropri-
ately reflect the essence of safety culture, but some of the attributes may not be adequate 
to assess these dimensions”. Therefore the model could be improved or re-formulated. 
The third model for safety culture is derived from an extensive literature research made 
by Reiman and Pietikäinen (2008). In this model the safety culture composes of three 
dimensions; organizational dimension, psychological dimension and social processes. 
Organizational dimensions are important to understand but also psychological factors 
must be taken into consideration to be able to attain the full picture of safety culture. 
Psychological factors refers to employee’s experiences of work and the conception the 
employee has on safe working practices and risks. Besides these two dimension, the social 
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processes show the mechanisms how people interpret safety, what kind of work practices 
exist and how the meaning of safety is created amongst employees. The three dimensions 
of the safety culture model is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 Safety culture model by Reiman and Pietikäinen (2008) 
The organizational dimension includes many common key elements found from the liter-
ature research. The management engagement to safety tends to be an important element 
in almost every safety culture model. The engagement can be divided to four sectors in-
cluding the safety management system definition, management’s actions for ensuring 
safety as well as actions of immediate superiors and safety communication.  Safety train-
ing, resourcing and management of change are also found as an important part of the 
organizational dimension of safety culture. The psychological dimension reflects the 
functioning of the key elements in the organizational dimension. The psychological fac-
tors include safety motivation and responsibility of safety. Important factor is also that 
the employee understands the hazards, risks and potential consequences in his own work 
and is able to control the risks. The third dimension of the safety culture model are the 
social processes. The social processes describe how the organizational processes affects 
the employees on different times and how the psychological states derived from the or-
ganizational processes affects the performance of employees and how they perceive 
safety. (Reiman & Pietikäinen 2008) The three dimensions of this safety culture model 
and the key elements of the dimensions are described in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
27 
Table 5 Safety culture model dimensions and elements, adapted from Reiman and Pie-
tikäinen (2008) 
Dimension Elements 
Organizational  
dimension 
Definition and maintenance of safety management system 
Management’s actions for ensuring safety 
Safety communication 
Supervisor’s actions for ensuring safety 
Collaboration and information flow between immediate work community 
Collaboration and information flow between facilities 
Reconciliation of know-how from different occupational groups 
Practices for organizational learning 
Ensuring competence and training 
Resource management 
Work instructions 
Management of external workers 
Management of Change 
Psychological dimension Safety motivation 
Understanding of the hazards, risks and potential consequences in own 
work 
Responsibility in organizational safety 
Work management 
Social processes Role in daily actions 
Formation of norms and social identity  
Optimization of working practices 
Normalization of deviations 
Institutionalization of work and safety related conceptions 
 
2.3 Management of Change in Safety culture transformation 
Change involves moving from the known to unknown. According to Murthy (2007) 
change is an alteration in the way things are done, that affects people, structure and tech-
nology. Nowadays change is an ever-present feature of organizational life, both at an 
operational and strategic level states Burnes (2004). Change management is therefore “the 
process of continually renewing an organization’s direction, structure and capabilities to 
serve the ever-changing need of external and internal customers” (Moran & Brightman 
2000). Since the rate of change in business environment is greater than at any time in the 
history, mastering strategies for managing change is becoming a very important manage-
rial skill (Moran & Brightman 2000; Senior 2002; Carnall 2003). Managing change as a 
manager is much more than just planning, resourcing, implementing and reviewing the 
change. Managing change is about managing people that are facing change. Therefore the 
known role of a manager is developing from manager to leader to change manager and 
ultimately to change leader in cases where change is followed through successfully. (Mo-
ran & Brightman 2000; Anderson & Anderson 2002, p.183) In this chapter different the-
ories and methods of Change management are introduced together with arguments what 
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makes Change management process effective. These theories introduce different strate-
gies for true organizational or cultural change and provides managers key information 
about Change management. The second section of this chapter focuses on the managerial 
role in leading change and seeks answers to questions like; what are the difficulties when 
facing change? How can a leader change behaviors of people and manage the resistance 
that relates to the change? And most importantly, what are the elements of successful 
change? 
2.3.1 Strategies for cultural transformation 
Literature in Change management is extensive. Many authors have developed their own 
Change management methods in the past decades and many more have studied and re-
viewed them. Kurt Lewin (1946) first developed a Change management process for a 
planned change. In this theory the planned change is seen to go through three different 
phases; Unfreeze, Act and move and Refreeze. Lewin suggested that the change process 
starts with unfreezing the current state of the organization by exposing the organization 
for change, after which the desired changes are implemented with a right leadership style. 
The Change process ends when the desired state of change has been reached and the or-
ganization refreezes again. Since the rate of change in business environments has been 
increasing since the 1940, also different approaches to Change management models have 
been introduced. In the 20th century many of the most famous theories of Change man-
agement have been represented. 
Kanter et al. (1992) created a method for implementing change that emphasizes the em-
ployee participation and team-orientation. In this ten phase method, first the organiza-
tion’s current state and its need for change is evaluated. Top management then creates a 
vision of the future and the direction, where the change is heading. It is important to 
separate the vision from the past and create a sense of urgency for the change. Since the 
role of employees and individuals are enhanced, the role of a strong leader must be sup-
ported from the top-management. Besides the support from top-management other spon-
sorships for the change has to be lined up. With this power line up the implementation 
plan is then crafted and enabling structures developed. According to Kanter et al. (1992) 
it is important that the information flows effectively across organization and therefore 
supports the adaptation of the change amongst employees. Employee participation and 
employee involvement in planning the change also makes the adaptation and institution-
alizing more effective.  
While Kanter et al. (1992) emphasizes the participation of employees in change, Judson 
reviews the subject from a different viewpoint. Judson (1991) identifies the barriers that 
might occur in different phases of change and suggests actions that can be taken to mini-
mize the effects of such barriers. He states that the resistance of change from the employee 
and manager side is the biggest possible barrier. In his model the Change process has five 
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phases starting with analyzing and planning the change, communicating it and then rein-
forcing it by gaining acceptance of new behaviors. Changing from status quo to desired 
state includes overcoming the resistance barrier. At last the change is consolidated and 
institutionalized. 
Kotter started to develop his own approach to manage change after so many change ini-
tiatives in different companies had failed. He analyzed the reasons for unsuccessful 
change attempts and developed an eight step method for managers to avoid the common 
mistakes. In Kotter’s (1996) model the change is implemented in highly top-down manner 
and the role of the manager is emphasized. First the sense of urgency and desire for 
change is established among the management teams and guiding coalitions created. En-
couraging the guiding coalition to team work improves its chances to lead the change 
initiative. Creating the vision is a crucial step and the lack of it the most common reason 
why the change initiative fails. The vision should be clear and understood in all levels of 
the organization and therefore the strategies for achieving the vision play an important 
role. After communicating the vision managers should empower a broad based action that 
addresses and removes all possible obstacles throughout the organization. This means not 
only changing the systems or structures that are undermining the vision but also that no 
single manager can counteract the change. The motivation for change is enhanced by 
generating short-term wins like visible performance improvements and rewards for em-
ployees. Using the credibility of change more improvement and changes are imple-
mented. The last step is to anchor the new approaches to the culture by articulating the 
new connections between new behaviors and performance and also aligning e.g. the KPI’s 
to fit the new approach.  
Luecke (2003) states that change won’t happen without urgency. Therefore he stresses 
the importance of “why” in any change initiative. By answering the why properly, people 
are motivated to the change. Besides the “why”, the “how” in problem identification plays 
also a significant role. Luecke (2003) argues that “the motivation and commitment to 
change are greatest when people who will have to make the change and live with it are 
instrumental in identifying the problem and planning its solution”. From these arguments 
Luecke created a seven step approach to manage change. After the first step of answering 
the “why” and the “how” a shared vision of how to organize and manage competitiveness 
is stated. Identifying the leadership and focusing on results and not so much on activities 
are the next phases of the model. In Luecke’s model the change is started in peripheries 
and from there it is let to spread without pushing from top-management. The success is 
instilled through policies and procedures and then reviewed. New strategies are then ad-
justed to meet the possible new problems.    
Cummings (2009) has organized a summary model from the diversity of theories for man-
aging change into five key elements. These key elements combine the theories of identi-
fying and overcoming resistance, the models that create visions and desired futures and 
theories of leader roles and learning practices. First element is about motivating change 
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and creating a readiness for change. By describing the core ideology of change the vision 
is created and political support is developed by identifying and influencing key stake-
holders. Next element is about managing the transition with the help of management 
structures and commitment. Sustaining the momentum is done by providing needed re-
sources for change, developing new competencies and skills and staying at the right 
course for change to happen. All of the theories and models that are presented in this 
chapter are summed up in Figure 10.   
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Figure 10 Change management methods, adapted from Al-Haddad (2015) 
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Many of these theories and models share the same key elements yet they differ in the way 
change is managed. Roughly divided into two groups the Lewin’s, Judson’s, Kotter’s and 
Cumming’s theories concentrate on the top-down management of change while Kanter 
and Luecke emphasizes the employee participation and team work, in other words a bot-
tom-up approach to change. However, all of the theories emphasizes the importance of 
management role and leadership in change management. To be able to choose the right 
model for change management, the type of change must be understood. Al-Haddad (2015) 
suggest that the Change method and the change type must be aligned to have an effective 
change outcome. Change type describes the kind and form of change and the characteris-
tics that make the change what it is. Change types can be classified according to scale and 
duration of change. Meyer (et al. 1990) classifies the change types according to two di-
mensions. First dimension states the level at which change is occurring, whether the 
change effects the whole industry or just the organization. The second dimension de-
scribes the change to either continuous or discontinuous change. Burnes (2004) identifies 
continuous change as the ability to change continuously in a fundamental manner. Luecke 
(2003) specifies the discontinuous change as onetime events that take place through 
widely separated initiatives that are then followed by long periods of stillness. Luecke 
also describes discontinuous change as “single, abrupt shift from the past”. Burnes (2004) 
differentiates also a third type of change called incremental change. Burnes refers to in-
cremental change when the individual parts of the organization deal separately with one 
problem and one objective at a time.  
Changing the Safety culture rests on the Safety leadership as well as Management of 
Change theories as stated previously in chapter 2.1. The change type for safety culture 
change could be described as an incremental change, since the turnaround concept is first 
run in selected units. Changing the safety culture means changing the behaviors and atti-
tudes of employees and management. Therefore the focus in the change management 
model should be in motivation and participation of employees without forgetting the 
leader’s role in Change. Kanter’s (1992) and Luecke’s (2003) models emphasize the 
Leader’s role as well as the role of the employees so therefore these two models are fur-
ther investigated and compared to each other. Kotter’s (1996) top-down manner in lead-
ing change is also compared to the previous models to have a better understanding of the 
manager’s role in change. The models and their linkages are described in Figure 11. Tod-
nem (2005) states that these three models also offer more practical guidance to organiza-
tions and managers than the other theories in the extensive field of change management 
literature. 
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Figure 11 Comparison of Kanter's, Luecke's and Kotter's Change management theo-
ries, adapted from Todnem (2005) 
All three models compared in Figure 11 emphasize the importance of a shared vision. 
Clear vision guides the change efforts and motivates people in change (Kotter 1996; Kan-
ter 1992; Luecke 2003). Another point that all theories agree on is the importance of 
institutionalizing the change. The change success should be instilled through policies and 
procedures and new approaches and behaviors anchored into the organization. The new 
connections between new behaviors and performance should be communicated and e.g. 
the KPI’s aligned to fit the new approach. (Kotter 1996; Kanter 1992; Luecke 2003). 
Luecke (2003) and Kotter (1996) share the common idea of short-term wins, the visible 
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results of improvement projects. They also propose a rewarding system that further mo-
tivates employees to get involved in a change. In Luecke’s method the good results of 
improvement projects in peripheries are thought to act also as motivation agents that 
spread the enthusiasm of change to other parts of the organization. Kanter (1992) and 
Kotter (1996) suggests that first a sense of urgency and desire for change has to be estab-
lished among the management teams to be able to get political support to the idea and 
form a guiding coalition that manages the change. Communication is also emphasized in 
both theories. Leadership role and the top-management support for the leader are clearly 
stated in Kanter’s (1992) and Luecke’s (2003) theories but it also plays a crucial part in 
Kotter’s (1996) method. Therefore the leadership role has to be further analyzed and its 
link to effective Change management identified. 
2.3.2 Leading cultural change 
Machiavelli described the problem of change in his book The Prince already in the 16th 
century and even nowadays the issue is familiar for many Change managers. Rajan (2000) 
states that the culture change programs are about “changing hearts, minds and souls” of 
employees. To be able succeed in this leader needs many attributes. Gill (2003) discusses 
the requirements of leadership and divides them to four different dimensions; the intel-
lectual/cognitive dimension, the spiritual dimension, the emotional- and behavioral di-
mension. He argues that effective change leadership requires the cognitive abilities to 
understand given information, reason with it, and make judgements and decisions based 
on this information. With these abilities the leader can produce a vision and a mission, 
the strategies how to follow the vision and also create shared values. The spiritual dimen-
sion focuses on the meaning and the sense of urgency of the change. According to Gill 
(2003) effective leadership also requires well developed emotional intelligence. The emo-
tional intelligence can be understood as an ability to understand oneself and other people 
and therefore to be able to use personal power to lead change. Behavior dimension focuses 
on leading by doing, where the manager acts as a positive example to others.  
“…there is no more delicate matter 
to take in hand, nor more dangerous 
to conduct, nor more doubtful in its 
success, than to set up as a leader in 
the introduction of changes. For he 
who innovates will have for his ene-
mies all those who are well off under 
the existing order of things, and only 
lukewarm supporters in those who 
might be better off under the new” 
(Machiavelli, 1469-1527) 
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Moran and Brightman (2000) argues that the most effective change leaders share a num-
ber of common characteristics. Effective change leaders describes the change in terms of 
how it effects the organization but also its individual effect. They allow the people to 
experiment and test the change and generate recommendations. They act as role models 
by leading the change with words and actions and display a constant dedication to the 
realization of change. Effective change leaders also interacts constantly with individuals 
and groups to legitimize the necessary change by communicating with employees and 
answering their questions. Kanter (1999) states that the most important attributes of a 
leader are the passion, conviction and confidence in others. The study of Chrusciel (2008) 
states that an effective change leader must have “the personal self-driven sense and will-
ingness” to promote the change as well as the ability to work with others. The change 
leader should also favor intrinsic values, like eagerness to learn and willingness to chal-
lenge himself over extrinsic rewards like recognition and praise from management.  
Besides the change leader attributes there are also other factors that contributes to the 
success or failure of a change initiative.  Kotter (1995) has studied the critical mistakes 
that managers often do in the different phases of change. He argues that the critical errors 
managers make in the beginning of the change initiative is that they underestimate how 
hard it is to drive people out of their comfort zones and often lack patience. In worst case 
managers are paralyzed by the downside possibilities of change. Moran and Brightman 
(2000) also discusses about the management fears on putting themselves on record as a 
leader of change since they fear what happens if the change initiative fails and who is to 
blame. Therefore it is important to form a political support and guiding coalition with 
shared commitment according to Kotter (1995). Kotter further argues that a coalition 
powerful enough to support change should include the chairman or division general man-
ager plus another 5 or 15 top-managers at least.  
The coalition should be able to sell their dream, the vision of change with the same pas-
sion and deliberation as an entrepreneur states Kanter (1999). The vision should be a clear 
and compelling statement about where the change is leading argues Kotter (1995). He 
states that often the vision is too blurry or complicated to be communicated effectively. 
Moran and Brightman (2000) discusses that people are goal-oriented and are pulled along 
by a sense of purpose, desire and value. Also Sullivan et al. (2001) state that people move 
towards those goals that they are attracted to, while withdrawing from those that would 
conflict their values. Therefore the vision should be in line with the values of the organi-
zation as well as the values of individual employees.  
Resistance to change occurs when the change violates a person’s sense of purpose (Moran 
& Brightman 2000). Resistance to change has long been recognized as a critical factor 
that influence the success of an organizational change effort (Waddell 1998). Gill (2003) 
describes the most powerful resistance as emotional, which derives from the dislike of 
surprises, lack of confidence or respect to those who are leading the change as well as the 
fear of moving out of the comfort zone. Kotter (2008) diagnoses the types of resistance 
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to parochial self-interest, lack of trust, different assessments and low tolerance for change. 
Self-interest is the fear of losing something and is shown as a focus of own best-interest 
and not on those of the organization.  Lack of trust in the motives of the change leaders 
and a different assessment of the current situation can lead to failure of the change initia-
tive. Resistance can be managed in different ways. Kotter (2008) proposes six methods 
for managing change that includes education, participation, facilitation, negotiation, ma-
nipulation and explicit and implicit coercion. These methods are presented in Table 6.  
Table 6 Methods for dealing with resistance to change (Kotter 2008) 
 Commonly used in  
situations 
Advantages Drawbacks 
Education + 
communication 
Where there is a lack of 
information of inaccurate 
information and analysis 
Once persuaded, people 
will often help with the 
implementation of the 
change 
Can be very time con-
suming if lots of people 
are involved 
Participation + 
involvement 
Where the initiators do 
not have all the infor-
mation they need to de-
sign the change, and 
where others have con-
siderable power to resist 
People who participate 
will be committed to im-
plementing change, and 
any relevant information 
they have will be inte-
grated into the change 
plan 
Can be very time con-
suming if participators 
design an inappropriate 
change 
Facilitation + 
support 
Where people are resist-
ing because of adjust-
ment problems 
No other approach works 
as well with adjustment 
problems 
Can be time consuming, 
expensive, and still fail 
Negotiation +  
agreement 
Where someone or some 
group will clearly lose 
out in a change, and 
where that group has 
considerable power to re-
sist 
Sometimes it is a rela-
tively easy way to avoid 
major resistance 
Can be too expensive in 
many cases if it alerts 
others to negotiate for 
compliance 
Manipulation +  
co-optation 
Where other tactics will 
not work or are too ex-
pensive 
It can be relatively quick 
and inexpensive solution 
to resistance problems. 
Can lead to future prob-
lems if people feel ma-
nipulated 
Explicit + 
 implicit  
coercion 
Where speed is essential, 
and the change initiators 
possess considerable 
power 
It is speedy and can over-
come any kind of re-
sistance 
Can be risky if it leaves 
people mad at the initia-
tors 
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Cummings (2009) states that the first step in overcoming resistance is learning how peo-
ple experience change. This requires empathy, support and active listening from the 
change leader’s side. He argues that when people feel that the change leaders are genu-
inely interested in their feelings they are likely to be less defensive. Cummings also em-
phasizes the importance of communication and the involvement of employees to over-
come resistance. Also Lewin (1991) concludes that involvement in learning, planning and 
implementation stages of change process lowers the employee resistance to change. But 
resistance can be also a constructive tool for Change management states Waddel (1998). 
Waddel argues that resistance points out that it is a fallacy to consider change itself to be 
inherently good. Therefore resistance influences the organization towards greater stability 
and critically observes the potential outcomes of change. Resistance can “draw the atten-
tion to aspects of change that may be inappropriate, not well thought through or perhaps 
plain wrong” states Waddel (1998). Therefore management should also see the positive 
sides of resistance, benefit from it and utilize the criticism to further improve the change 
initiative. 
Resistance and other barriers of change can be overcome also by systematically planning 
and creating short-term wins. Kotter (1995) argues that most of the people won’t go on 
the long march to change it they don’t see compelling evidence of good results. Managers 
often fail in this because they don’t differentiate from hoping for short term wins and 
actually creating them. Therefore in successful change the managers should actively look 
for ways to get performance improvements, achieve clear objectives and reward the peo-
ple with recognition. Also Kanter (1992) emphasizes the importance of recognition and 
argues that it is the most underutilized motivational tool in organizations. Recognition not 
only brings the change cycle to logical conclusion but also motivates people to make a 
change again in the future. But change process should not be declared concluded or suc-
cessful before the changes are sank deeply into a company’s culture argues Kotter (1995).  
He states that until the new behaviors are rooted in social norms and shared values, also 
described as “the way we do things around here”, the change is subject to degradation as 
soon as the pressure for change is removed. The change success should be instilled 
through policies and procedures, and new approaches and behaviors anchored into the 
organization. The new connections between new behaviors and performance should be 
communicated and e.g. the KPI’s aligned to fit the new approach. (Kotter 1996; Kanter 
1992; Luecke 2003). Kotter (1995) also states that sufficient time should be given to make 
sure that also the next generation of top-management really personifies with the new ap-
proaches.  
Even though the change leaders have avoided the mistakes in the different phases of 
change, the change initiative can still fail because of the differences in national cultures. 
Kirch et al. (2010) argues that the national cultures influence the way in which organiza-
tions are structured, how employees are motivated and also what kind of change approach 
can be successful.  Therefore management methods and techniques are not generally 
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cross-culturally transferable states Molinsky (2007). The best known studies of cultural 
dimensions are from Hofstede (1980, 2000), who conducted a large research project in 
multi-national corporations. Hofstede (2000) identified and validated five dimensions for 
national culture differences; individualism vs collectivism, masculinity vs femininity, un-
certainty avoidance, power distance and long-term vs short-term orientation. In individu-
alistic countries people tend to prioritize themselves over group success. The emotional 
roles between genders are divided to competitive males and caring females. Uncertainty 
avoidance refers to the extent to which members of a culture prefer to avoid uncertainty 
and feel uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. The dimension of power 
distance is stated as the extent to which unequal distribution of power is accepted. In this 
dimension the less powerful members in high power distance cultures accepts that the 
supervisors have more power than they do. Long-term orientation refers to the way how 
people accept the delay of results.  
Kirch (2010) argues that the most organizational change approaches have been developed 
in highly individualistic and low power distance cultures, as for example in the United 
States. Therefore different approaches are needed to have a successful change in other 
cultures. Harzig and Hofstede (1996) states that the strongest resistance to change is in 
cultures that are characterized by high power distance, low individualism and high uncer-
tainty avoidance e.g. in Korea and Latin America. Therefore the lowest resistance to 
change is in cultures with low power distance and high individualism as for in Nordic 
counties. The different culture dimension and suggestion for modified approaches as well 
as example counties are presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7 Cultural dimensions and modified approaches, adapted from Kirch (2010) 
 
Power distance Individualism Masculinity 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
High 
Remedial actions 
will be fast 
Stress and distress 
level of employees 
should be moni-
tored 
Provide high level 
of information 
Increase under-
standing of vision 
Provide leadership 
training 
Ensure that people 
have clear roles and 
objectives 
Provide leadership 
training 
Provide training for 
team work 
Focus on more sup-
porting strategies 
Reduce the 
amount and pace 
of change 
Progress slower 
through the 
phases of change 
Provide large 
amount of infor-
mation from su-
pervisors 
Ensure confi-
dence in company 
Ensure that peo-
ple feel recog-
nized and re-
warded 
Coun-
ties 
Arabic counties 
Russia 
China 
India 
Nordic countries 
USA 
Australia 
Singapore 
Hong Kong 
South Africa 
Japan 
Italy 
Germany 
USA 
Greece 
Korea 
Latin America 
Japan 
Arabic counties 
Catholic countries 
Low 
Ensure that people 
have clear perfor-
mance objectives 
and roles 
Allow high level 
of employee in-
volvement 
Increase the trust 
in leadership 
Motivate and re-
ward 
Communicate the 
need for change 
and vision clearly 
Ensure adequate in-
formation 
 
Provide team work 
opportunities 
More direct com-
munication from 
direct supervisor 
Ensure employees 
have clear roles 
 
Coun-
ties 
Nordic countries 
USA 
Australia 
Singapore 
Japan 
Hong Kong 
South Africa 
Korea 
Latin America 
Japan 
Arabic counties 
Sweden 
Spain 
Thailand 
Korea 
 
Singapore 
Nordic countries 
USA 
Hong Kong 
South Africa 
Protestant coun-
tries 
 
39 
To have a successful change many different aspects need to be considered as previously 
stated in this chapter. The most important role in success of the change initiative plays 
the skills of the leader.  But successful changes seems to have also many other common 
characteristics argues Moran and Brightman (2000). They state that a successful change 
consists of a series of closer and closer approximations to increasingly ambitions goals 
and are embraced by increasing amount of people in the organization. The change is at 
the same time top-down and bottom-up should be a shared responsibility of everyone in 
the organization. Therefore the values of both organization and individuals plays an im-
portant role. Unless people can integrate the change in personal level, they cannot sustain 
it organizationally (Moran & Brightman 2000). Sullivan et al. (2002) has created a Logi-
cal Levels model, where the level of change is described as a triangle presented in Figure 
12. 
Sullivan et al. (2002) argues that the lower the level of change, the easier it is to effect. 
Changing environment or capabilities are easier for organization than changing its iden-
tity and core values. Rajan (2000) states that the culture change programs are about 
“changing hearts, minds and souls” of employees. Therefore these values, new ap-
proaches and behaviors are important to be anchored into the organization. The change 
success should be also instilled through policies and procedures and the new connections 
between new behaviors and performance should be communicated to all employees. All 
of these elements are the core of successful change. (Kotter 1996; Kanter 1992; Luecke 
2003). 
2.4 Safety performance measurement and Tools 
Measurement is a key action in any management process and forms the basis for contin-
uous improvement. The dilemma between organizational performance measurement and 
safety performance measurement is that usually the organizational performance measure-
ment is positive in nature e.g. return of investment and profit percentage while safety 
Figure 12 Logical Levels model (Sullivan et al. 2002) 
40 
performance measurement generally lies on injury statistics, the measures of failures. 
However, even if the organization has a low injury rate, it is no guarantee that the work-
place is safe and the risks are being controlled. Therefore safety performance measure-
ment should include various safety indicators and an efficient process to measure the in-
dicators. According to United Kingdom’s Health and Safety executive (HSE 2011) the 
Health and safety performance measurement should seek answers to the questions as: 
 Where are we now relative to our overall health and safety aims and objectives? 
 Where are we now in controlling hazards and risks? 
 How do we compare with others? 
 Why are we where we are? 
 Are we getting better or worse over time? 
 Are we doing the right things? 
 Are we doing things right consistently? 
 Is our management of health and safety proportionate to our hazards and risks? 
 Is an effective health and safety management system in place across all parts of 
the organization? 
 Is our culture supportive of health and safety, particularly in the face of competing 
demands? 
 
In this chapter first the processes for measuring health and safety are introduced and an-
swers for questions like why to measure performance, who should measure it and how, 
when to measure and what to measure are answered. In the following chapter the differ-
ences between active monitoring and reactive monitoring are argued and different safety 
indicators introduced. The key focus of the chapter is to provide an extensive set of safety 
indicators and examples of their range of usage. Thus enhance the knowledge of safety 
indicators and the safety performance measurement in its entirety.  
2.4.1 Processes for measuring and sustenance of Safety 
Measuring safety performance is one key element in an effective safety management. 
Safety measurement evaluates the organization’s ability to manage safety. Not only is 
safety measurement required in guidelines e.g. ILO-OHS 2011 and OHSAS 18001 but it 
also provides important information about how the risks are controlled in the workplace. 
The primary purpose of safety measurement is to provide information on how the safety 
management system operates in practice, to identify areas that need improvements, to 
provide basis for continuous improvement and to provide feedback and motivation. 
Health and safety performance should be measured at each management level of the or-
ganization and the responsibilities for measuring and execution of actions allocated 
clearly. Most importantly senior management needs to ensure that the control measures 
to control the risks are in place, complied with and effective. (HSE 2011) 
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One general model of how to measure safety performance consists of nine steps (HSE 
2011). 
1. Identify key processes 
2. Analyze safety management system and risk controls 
3. Identify critical measures for each components of the safety management system 
and risk controls 
4. Establish baselines for each measure 
5. Establish goals or targets for each measure 
6. Assign responsibilities 
7. Compare actual performance to targets 
8. Plan and implement corrective actions 
9. Review the measures 
The first step to measure the safety performance was to identify the key processes. The 
two key processes in managing safety are the safety management system of the organiza-
tion and the risk control systems that control the hazards. These key processes should be 
analyzed with the help of people that have implemented the systems. The idea is to eval-
uate how the key processes operate in practice. For each key process critical measures are 
identified. These critical measures should be meaningful to those who use them, under-
standable, capable of showing trends and timely. These critical measures can be identified 
by answering questions as: 
 What outcome do we want? 
 When do we want it? 
 How would we know if we achieved the desired outcome? 
 What are people expected to do? 
 When should they do it? 
 What result should it produce? 
 How would we know that people are doing what they should be doing? 
For every critical measure the baselines and targets are established and the actual perfor-
mance compared against these targets. Important is also to analyze the reasons behind the 
abnormal performance and identify the root causes. After that the corrective actions can 
be designed and implemented and the results re-evaluated. This to become an effective 
process, the safety performance measurement should be build and balanced between three 
different elements: the input, process and outcome. Input monitoring focuses on the na-
ture, scale and distribution of hazards that the organizational activities create. The process 
element provides information about the risk controls, safety culture and management ar-
rangements. Management arrangements measurement evaluates the performance of the 
individual components of the safety management system while safety culture measure-
ment focuses on the positive health and safety activities in the organization. Measuring 
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risk controls provide information about how well the hazards in the workplace are con-
trolled. The outcomes must be also effectively measured to see the possible failures in the 
health and safety management system, the injuries and accidents that resulted from these 
failures. (HSE 2011) The elements of an effective health and safety measurement process 
are presented in the Figure 13. 
Figure 13 Elements of an effective health and safety measurement process, adapted 
from HSE (2011) 
To have the process for health and safety measurement in place is the first step in moni-
toring and measuring safety successfully. However, in order to retrieve the information 
about the actual safety performance of an organization, one needs to know how to meas-
ure the critical factors. Since an effective health and safety measurement process includes 
elements of input, process and outcome measurements, also the indicators for measuring 
the performance of these elements should be understood. In the next chapter different key 
performance indicators of safety are introduced. First the key performance indicators 
(KPI’s) for process measurement are described, followed by the KPI’s that are commonly 
used in evaluation of risk control systems. Last, an extensive summary set of KPI’s for 
measuring the health and safety measurement process elements are introduced. 
2.4.2 Key performance indicators of safety 
An indicator can be considered any measure, quantitative or qualitative, that seeks to pro-
duce information on an issue of interest. Safety indicators therefore provide information 
on current organizational safety performance. Different categorization for safety perfor-
mance indicators exist in the literature yet many distinctions have the same principles. 
Most commonly used is the distinction between leading and lagging indicators. Typically 
the leading and lagging indicators are considered on a time scale where leading indicators 
precede harm and lagging indicators follow harm. (Reiman & Pietikäinen 2012) Leading 
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indicators can be though as precursors to harm that provide early warning signals of po-
tential failures and therefore offer the opportunity to detect and mitigate risks before ac-
cidents or incident occurs (Sinelnikov et al. 2015). Leading indicators can also be viewed 
as measures of positive steps that organizations take that may prevent an incident occur-
ring (Grabowski et al 2007). According to Blair and O’Toole (2010) the leading indicators 
“measure the actions, behaviors and processes, the things that people actually do for 
safety”. Leading indicators can therefore be used to measure the input and process per-
formance of the health and safety measurement process described in Figure 13. 
Despite the many positive aspects that leading indicators bring to the safety measurement 
process, the most commonly used safety performance indicators are the lagging indica-
tors. Lagging indicators measure the outcomes of activities or events that have already 
happened. (Reiman & Pietikäinen 2012)  Lagging indicators are therefore the measures 
of OHS outcomes or outputs like incidents or accident and provide a measure of past 
performance. (Erikson 2009) The importance on lagging indicators is that they provide 
opportunities for organizations to check safety performance, learn from failures and im-
prove the overall health and safety management. (HSE 2011) Therefore both of the safety 
performance indicators should be used to effectively measure and monitor the safety per-
formance of an organization.  
Health and safety management system is the core in an effective safety management and 
therefore an important factor to monitor. The study of Podgórski (2015) introduces dif-
ferent KPI’s to measure the individual components of the occupational health and safety 
management system. The components of the OHSMS are derived from the ILO-OSH 
2001 guideline, which divides the elements of OHSMS to policy, organizing, planning 
and implementation, evaluation and action for improvement. The study showed that lead-
ing indicators should be prioritized in developing the KPI’s for OHS management system. 
The set of KPI’s to measure the effectiveness of each OHSMS elements are described in 
the Table 8. 
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Table 8 KPI's to measure the individual components of OHSMS, adapted from Podgórski 
(2015) 
 
OHSMS component Example KPI’s 
P
o
li
cy
 
 OHS policy Number of OSH policy reviews carried out by top management 
Percentage of workers declaring good knowledge of OSH policy 
Number of safety walkthroughs performed by top managers 
Worker participation Number of OSH improvements proposed by workers 
Number of OSH Commission meetings on regular OSH issues 
O
rg
a
n
iz
in
g
 
    Responsibilities and 
accountability 
Percentage of work posts with defined OSH responsibilities and duties 
Delivering OSH train-
ing 
Percentage of workers participating in OSH refresher courses 
Number of hours for OSH training per person 
OHS training 
programs 
Percentage of OSH training courses reviewed and improved for their 
quality and effectiveness 
OHSMS documenta-
tion 
Percentage of OSH MS procedures improved due to corrective actions 
Percentage of workers participating in trainings on OSH MS structure, 
procedures, etc. 
Communication Number of meetings conducted by managers to inform workers on 
OSH issues 
Rating of the effectiveness of OSH communication via workforce sur-
vey 
Number of issues of company’s OSH bulletin or other internal OSH 
publications 
P
la
n
n
in
g
 a
n
d
 i
m
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 
      OSH goals and im-
provement plans 
Number of measurable OSH improvement goals established 
Percentage of tasks in OSH improvement plans verified and accepted 
with regard to the quality and effectiveness 
Risk assessment pro-
cesses 
Percentage of periodically verified risk assessment processes with re-
gard to their validity of risk control measures applied 
Implementation of 
risk control measures 
Percentage of workers informed on risk levels and risk control 
measures applied 
Number of risk control measure implementations with hierarchy of 
measures considered 
Management of 
change 
Number of analyses of impact on OSH carried out with regard to 
changes in OSH regulations, technologies and knowledge 
Percentage of workstation with risk assessment verified in course of in-
troduction of new machinery, materials, changing work method etc. 
Emergency prepared-
ness and response 
Percentage of workers trained on emergency procedures, including res-
cue activities and first aid 
Procurement Percentage of periodically verified OSH requirements applied in pur-
chase specifications 
Percentage of purchased larger objects for which risk assessment has 
been carried out prior to bringing them into use 
Contracting Number of contractors assessed for their compliance with OSH man-
agement requirements 
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E
v
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
 
 Performance moni-
toring and measure-
ment 
Percentage of definitions of leading and lagging performance indica-
tors subject to periodical review and update 
Investigation of 
work-related acci-
dent, diseases and in-
cidents and their im-
pact on OSH 
Number of corrective and preventive actions carried out as a result of 
root cause analyses of work-related accidents, diseases and incidents 
Percentage of medical consultations carried out within the programme 
of workers’ health surveillance 
Management system 
audit 
Percentage of OHSMS components or processes subject to assessment 
during internal OHSMS audits 
Management review Percentage of recommendations formulated by top managers at 
OHSMS reviews considered in OSH improvement plans 
A
ct
io
n
 f
o
r 
im
p
ro
v
em
en
t 
 
Preventive and cor-
rective action 
Percentage of completed corrective and preventive actions in relation 
to all actions initiated by OHSMS audits and reviews, OSH perfor-
mance monitoring, and root cause analyses of work-related 
accidents, incidents and diseases 
Percentage of completed corrective actions reviewed and evaluated for 
their effectiveness 
Continual improve-
ment 
Number of new OSH goals and objectives established in the frame-
work of OHSMS continual improvement 
Number of OSH management KPIs subject to benchmarking with other 
companies 
  
Risk control systems is the second measurable element in the process of health and safety 
measurement. Risk control systems are identified by identifying the hazards that can 
cause accidents. For every hazard a control system is placed and the critical activities of 
the control systems stated. To be able to evaluate that the control system works properly, 
a leading indicator is set for every critical activity of the control system. Important is also 
to set the performance tolerance, where the activity of the control is acceptable or not. 
However, even if the performance is in acceptable level an incident might still occur. 
Therefore it is also important to monitor the overall performance of the risk controls sys-
tems with lagging indicators. Lagging indicators show the errors and failures of the sys-
tem after an incident has happened. Lagging indicators are important to be able to further 
improve the risk control systems. (HSG254 2006) The process for setting KPI’s for risk 
control systems is described in Figure 14.  
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Figure 14 Process for setting KPI's for risk control systems 
Safety culture is the third measurable element in the process of health and safety meas-
urement. Safety culture is an indicator of the whole organizational safety performance as 
previously stated in chapter 2.2. Therefore it is logical to measure with leading indicators. 
Reiman and Pietikäinen (2012) divides the leading indicators to two groups, the lead 
monitor indicators and drive indicators. This distinction also helps to understand the 
method to measure the safety culture. The lead monitor indicators indicate the potential 
and the capacity of the organization to achieve safety. These indicators measure the in-
ternal dynamics of the sociotechnical systems and provide information on the activities 
of the system that affects also the safety culture. The drive indicators in turn indicate the 
development activities of the organization at improving safety. Therefore the drive indi-
cators are measures of the fulfillment of the selected safety management activities and 
directs the sociotechnical activity by motivating certain safety-related activities. These 
drive indicators and monitor indicators can also be used in measuring the first two ele-
ments, the management system and risk controls of the health and safety measurement 
process. Examples of monitor and drive indicators are presented in Table 9 and Table 10. 
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Table 9 Lead monitor indicators, adapted from Reiman & Oedewald (2009) 
Monitor indicator Example KPI’s 
Work and safety 
motivation 
1. The extent to which the personnel report that their work is meaningful and im-
portant 
2. The extent to which human performance tools are utilized in daily practice 
3. The extent to which personnel consider safety as a value that guides their eve-
ryday work 
Controllability of 
work 
1. Employees’ reported sense of control over their work 
2. The extent to which work is carried out in accordance 
to the processes described in the management system 
3. The amount of slack resources to cope with unexpected or demanding situa-
tions 
Understanding 
of hazards 
1. The extent to which the personnel understands the hazards that are connected to 
their work  
2. The extent to which the personnel has been trained in accordance with the 
planned training program 
3. The extent to which the personnel are aware of 
the limitations of human performance capacity 
4. The extent of personnel’s awareness of the technical /physical condition of sys-
tems, structures and components 
5. The findings from external audits concerning hazards that have not been per-
ceived by personnel/management previously 
Understanding 
of safety 
1. The extent to which the personnel have basic knowledge of human perfor-
mance issues 
2. The extent to which the defense-in-depth principle is understood among the 
personnel 
3. The extent to which Human Factors are considered neutral phenomena and not 
something to be avoided (i.e., a negative phenomenon) 
4. The extent to which changes and improvements are considered at system level 
as opposed to unit or group level 
Felt responsibil-
ity for the entire 
organization 
1. The extent to which the personnel are willing to spend personal effort on safety 
issues and take responsibility for their actions 
2. The extent to which the personnel make initiatives in improving organizational 
practices or report problems to the management 
Mindfulness and  
vigilance 
1. The extent to which the personnel continuously seek to identify new risks and 
enhance their view on the hazards of their work 
2. The extent to which the personnel at all levels exhibit a questioning attitude 
3. The extent to which external audits provide results that are in accordance with 
the findings in internal audits or prevalent conceptions of the personnel 
Social 
interaction and 
activities 
1. The extent to which safety-conscious behavior and uncertainty expression is 
socially accepted and supported 
2. The extent to which the gap between work as prescribed and work as actually 
done is known and monitored in the organization 
3. The extent to which the personnel perceive that they have to make tradeoffs be-
tween safety and economy in daily work 
Technology 1. Continuous measures of the current condition of systems, components and 
structures 
2. Percentage of safety–critical equipment that fail inspection/test 
Environmental 
variability 
1. Extreme weather phenomena for process plants 
2. Age distribution of the population for healthcare organizations 
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Table 10 Drive indicators, adapted from Reiman & Oedewald (2009) 
Drive indicator Example KPI’s 
Safety  
management and 
leadership 
1. Management is actively committed to, and visibly involved in, safety activities 
2. Number of management walk arounds per month 
3. Number of times safety is a topic in the management meetings  
 
Strategic  
management 
1. Safety is visibly and systematically considered in the organization’s official 
plans and strategy documents 
2. Systematic ageing management program exists for systems, components and 
structures 
3. Program of preventive maintenance is in place and it is revised according to 
maintenance history 
4. There is a system for documenting history data on equipment and their mainte-
nance actions 
 
Supervisor  
activity 
1. Superior provides positive feedback on safety-conscious behavior of the per-
sonnel 
 
Proactive safety 
development 
1. System for reporting and analyzing incidents is implemented 
2. Independent safety reviews and audits are carried 
out regularly and proactively 
3. There is a system for gathering development initiatives from the personnel 
4. There is a system for analyzing the common safety-related findings (trends, 
root causes, changes, variety of corrective actions, generalizability to other com-
ponents/equipment) from the maintenance history as well as events and near 
misses in the organization 
 
Competence 
management 
1. An adequate system exists for the identification of current competence profiles 
2. There are clear objectives established for training programs 
3. A mechanism is in place to ensure that the scope, content and quality of the 
training programs are adequate 
4. Feedback is gathered from the trainees and is utilized in developing the training 
program 
 
Change manage-
ment 
1. There is a clear definition of what constitutes a technical change or an organi-
zational change in the safety policy of the organization 
2. Risk assessment is done for organizational changes 
3. There is a procedure for planning, implementing and 
follow-up of technical and organizational changes 
4. The effects of the implementation period to organizational practices is moni-
tored during the change 
 
Work conditions 
management 
1. The availability of sufficient workforce is controlled 
2. Procedures are updated regularly 
 
Work process 
management 
1. The bottlenecks of information flow are identified and controlled  
2. Tasks and situations where routines may develop and where they might have 
consequences for safety are identified 
 
Contractor man-
agement 
1. There is a process for purchasing outside work 
2. A record of contractor safety performance is utilized in decision making con-
cerning contracts 
3. Contractors are trained on safety culture issues and work practices of the client 
organization 
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Hazard control 1. A systematic corrective action program is in place to deal with deviations 
2. Hazard identification and risk assessments are used to develop policies, proce-
dures and practices 
3. Adequate barriers are set against the identified hazards 
4. The organization has analyzed potential accident scenarios and set barriers to 
prevent them 
5. There are adequate human performance tools (HPT) to facilitate safe behavior 
 
Contingency 
planning and 
emergency 
preparedness 
1. The organization has an adequate on-site emergency preparedness plan 
2. There is regular training on emergencies on-site 
 
 
Lagging indicators are the measures of OHS outcomes or outputs, the final elements of 
safety measurement process. The importance of lagging indicators is that they provide 
opportunities for organizations to check the safety performance of the safety management 
system and risk control systems, learn from failures and improve the overall health and 
safety management process. Lagging indicators can be negative e.g. incidents or accident 
or positive e.g. employee satisfaction. Examples of the Lagging indicators are presented 
below. (EU OHS) 
 Injuries and work-related ill health in terms of Lost time incidents 
 Lost Time Incident Frequency (Rate)  
 Production days lost through sickness absence  
 Incidents or near misses  
 Complaints about work that is carried out in unsafe or unhealthy conditions  
 Number of early retirements 
 The percentage of productive planned work days realized  
 Number of hours worked by the total work force without lost time injury 
 Number of working days since the last accident 
 Employee satisfaction 
An effective health and safety measurement process includes elements of input, process 
and outcome measurements. The indicators for measuring the performance of these ele-
ments are previously described in this chapter. Both leading indicators and lagging indi-
cators should be used to effectively monitor the process elements of the health and safety 
measurement process. However, measuring performance for measurements sake is not 
the way to improve performance. Every organization should design and implement per-
formance measurement processes according to the genuine need for monitoring. For this, 
this chapter has provided many tools and examples of key performance indicators to mon-
itor the safety performance of the organization. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND EXECU-
TION 
3.1 Target company and prior Safety development projects 
The target company of this thesis is ABB Group, one of the global leaders in power and 
automation technologies. Currently ABB has an extensive group of safety procedures and 
KPI’s to measure the safety performance yet in some facilities the safety performance is 
lagging from the average safety performance of the company. The plans for improving 
the safety performance have been targeted to single processes and actions. However, the 
notable improvements in safety performance have not been reached in certain facilities. 
The tools to improve safety in workplace are provided, safety performance is measured 
and reported but the overall picture of the meaning of safety is still lacking. To be able to 
truly improve the safety performance the leadership behavior must be evaluated and im-
proved. 
In 1988, Swedish corporation Asea and Swiss BBC Brown Boveri merged resulting ABB 
Group. Nowadays ABB Group operates in around 100 countries across three regions: 
Europe, the Americas, Asia and Middle East and Africa. ABB Group has more than 300 
manufacturing sites around the world employing 135 000 people. ABB Group is orga-
nized to four global divisions:  
 Electrification Products 
 Discrete Automation and Motion 
 Process Automation 
 Power Grids 
These divisions are made up of specific business units focused on particular industries 
and product categories. In addition ABB Group has group functions that organizes the 
general functions and services related e.g. to finance, communication, human resources 
and sustainability. ABB Group is one of the few large companies that have implemented 
the matrix structure in the organization successfully.  In this thesis ABB Group is referred 
as ABB which includes the four divisions and the group functions. (ABB 2016, pp.70-
77) 
The direction of business in ABB is defined by the Board of Directors. The board deter-
mines the organization of the ABB Group and appoints, removes and supervises the per-
sons entrusted with the management and representation of ABB. The Board has delegated 
the executive management of ABB to the CEO and the other members of the Executive 
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Committee. The CEO and under his direction, the other members of the Executive Com-
mittee are responsible for ABB’s overall business and affairs and day-to-day manage-
ment. Division managers and Region managers in the Executive committee are responsi-
ble of their technology and geographical area. In countries, management organization 
consist of country managers, local business unit managers and local product group man-
agers. (ABB 2016, pp.31) 
This thesis focuses on the global Discrete Automation and Motion Division, later referred 
as DM Division. The DM division has approximately 29,700 employees as of December 
2015 and operations in Europe, the Americas, Asia, Middle East and Africa. DM Division 
generated $9.1 billion of revenues in 2015, total of 24% of the ABB Group revenues in 
2015. DM Division is divided into four different Business units: (ABB 2016, pp.70-73) 
 Motors and generators 
 Drives and controls 
 Power Conversion 
 Robotics 
One part of DM Division in North America is Baldor Electric Group, later referred as 
Baldor. ABB acquired Baldor in 2011aiming to penetrate the North American industrial 
market. Baldor was a leading power and automation technology group and was a leader 
in industrial motors in North America. The transaction positioned ABB as a leading sup-
plier of industrial motion solutions and enabled ABB to tap a potential for rail and wind 
investments in North America. (ABB 2011) In 2013, ABB acquired a company called 
Power-One, the world’s second largest manufacturer of photovoltaic inverters. As a re-
sult, ABB represented the most comprehensive solar value proposition on the market and 
one of the industry’s broadest inverter product portfolios. Power-One’s facility in North 
America is located in Phoenix and therefore also later on in this thesis referred as Phoenix. 
(ABB 2013) 
3.2 Work tasks for concept construction 
The concept design and construction is built on three individual work tasks. First, the 
theoretical background forms the base for the concept. The theories of managing safety, 
safety culture, management of change and safety performance measurement sets the pe-
rimeter on which the concept is constructed.  Thus, all legal requirements or guidelines 
are fulfilled and theories for potential building blocks of the concept are taken into con-
sideration.  However, theory is only one part of a successful concept, also practical infor-
mation about different approaches should be evaluated and included in the concept re-
quirements. Therefore, prior Baldor and Phoenix safety development projects are ana-
lyzed and evaluated and information about the benefits and drawbacks of both cases are 
gathered. From these three work tasks the concept can be developed. Concept develop-
ment is divided into three different elements; the concept’s requirements, the construction 
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of the concept and last the concept piloting. The work tasks and concept’s elements are 
presented in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15 Work tasks and elements of the concept 
The objective of the work tasks Case Baldor and Case Phoenix is to seek information 
about the safety improvement projects. These work tasks identifies the practical infor-
mation about different approaches in safety culture improvements and forms the essential 
part together with the theoretical framework for concept construction. The target is to find 
suitable actions or trainings that can also be used in the new concept. The information 
about the safety improvement projects in Baldor and Phoenix was collected from inter-
views, intranet and database analysis. The past safety performance data was gathered 
from the Global Incident Database (GID), used in ABB to collect data in leading and 
lagging indicators. GID is updated on a monthly basis by local HSE or general managers 
and therefore enables to see the performance variation both in short and long term. The 
database analysis enables to review the validity of the information also in the future. The 
same channels and databases can be also used later on if additional information about 
these cases or other projects within ABB is required. Therefore the used concepts, train-
ings and approaches can be identified and analyzed and their suitability to the concept 
can be later evaluated. 
The DM division HSE manager and the Director of HSE, DM Division North Americas 
were interviewed about the safety improvement projects and information about the used 
procedures and executed actions in these projects was gathered. The interviews were per-
formed in three different timeslots. In the first interview the persons described the safety 
improvement projects in their own words while notes were taken. In the second interview 
the transcript of the first interview was gone through and additional information included. 
This was important to ensure that all the information about the actions was recorded and 
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the timetable of the actions was verified. The third interview acted as the final review of 
both recorded safety improvement projects. All the collected information and final tran-
script was later reviewed and validated by the Director of HSE, Baldor NAM.  
3.3 Development of Safety culture transformation concept 
The development of the concept is divided to three elements, listing the requirements of 
the concept, construction of the concept and concept piloting. In this chapter the require-
ments of the concept are introduced followed by the description how the concept was 
built and who was participating in the construction. The requirements of the concept are 
built according to the knowledge attained from the theoretical parts as well as according 
to the good practices from Baldor and Phoenix’s safety improvement projects. The pro-
cess for creating the requirements of the concept is presented in Figure 16. 
Theoretical background Case studies
Safety management systems
     - Guidelines
     - Management principles
Concept’s 
requirements
Safety Leadership
     - Leadership styles
     - Leadership and safety performance
     - Leaders engagement
Safety culture
     - Assessment of safety culture
     - Models
Management of Change
     - Methods 
     - Resistance
     - National cultures
Measuring safety
     - OHSMS
     - Risk control systems
     - KPI’s
Training on management 
principles
Present process to evaluate 
OHSMS
Enhance transformational 
leadership, safety participation 
and safety compliance
Present process for safety 
culture assessment
and institutionalization
Provide support for change
Enhance employee participation
Adaptable globally
Training and procedures to 
plan, monitor and improve 
safety
Good practices and actions 
used in safety improvement 
projects
 
Figure 16 Requirements of the concept 
From the theory some key points are emphasized in the concept development. Safety 
management system theory presented the guidelines and legal requirements of the 
OHSMS and provided information about the best practices found in literature for man-
agement principles. Safety leadership part introduced different leadership styles, linked 
the leadership to safety performance and provided examples of leadership engagement. 
Safety culture theory focused on assessment of the safety culture and on different models 
how the safety culture can be developed. For this also the management of change theory 
provides support as well as information about the methods to implement change and the 
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actions to beat resistance. One important part was also the national organizational differ-
ences that were introduced in the management of change theory. Last the safety perfor-
mance measurement piece provided concrete examples on how to measure the safety per-
formance of organization with leading and lagging indicators. 
The theoretical framework and the good practices from Baldor and Phoenix case studies 
forms the base for the concept’s requirements. The concept to meet the requirements of 
safety management systems and management principles there should be an organized 
training both on OHSMS and management principles. The concept should present man-
agers a process with what they can measure the performance of their OHSMS and also 
test their ability to meet the requirements of management principles. To fulfill the Safety 
leadership requirements the concept should enhance transformational leadership by 
providing training for managers on how to become transformational leaders. Support and 
concrete actions should be presented how to improve the safety participation of employ-
ees and also actions how to improve safety compliance. Concept should also take into 
consideration the personal leadership engagement, the concept should motivate the man-
agers to be more a transformational leader than manager.  
Concept should provide information on how managers can measure the current situation 
of the safety culture in their facilities, how to analyze the results and multiple examples 
of possible improvement actions. Important is also to provide managers a tool kit how 
they can institutionalize the safety changes in their organization. For this also manage-
ment of change theories should be presented to enhance the knowledge of possible barri-
ers and troubles the managers might face when leading change. Concept should therefore 
provide both theoretical knowledge as well as practical support for the managers. Practi-
cal support can be arranged with mentors that are available for the managers in case of 
need. Since the success of change depends also of the national culture the concept should 
be designed so that it is adaptable around the world. Methods to enhance employee par-
ticipation in change amongst with other trainings should be designed so that they are 
universally understood and trainable.  
The construction of the concept started with discussing the objectives of the concept with 
DM Division HSE manager and the Director of HSE, DM Division North Americas. Al-
ready was known that incidents tend to happen in specific local business units. Even 
though the safety performance in these locations was improving over time, there were 
still too many lost time and serious incidents. Therefore the objective was to create a 
concept to support the local business units in managing incidents and creating a true safety 
culture improvement in their facilities. Different options for the design of the concept was 
discussed. First option was to create different modules according to the safety culture the 
plants were already having. For dependent cultures the concept should provide more basic 
training on safety, for interdependent cultures the concept could concentrate more on 
leadership and commitment. Because ABB has not yet the process for measuring the 
safety culture in facilities, this option was not available at this time.  
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Another option was to build the concept according to organizational levels. Since pro-
cesses and programs in ABB are implemented via line management, also the concept 
implementation would be most efficient this way. The concept should provide targeted 
trainings for managers and employees on different organizational levels. To have an ef-
fective safety culture change, leadership plays critical role. Because of this, the concept 
was planned so that its main focus is on managers that are responsible for the safety per-
formance as well as HSE managers that are working with safety issues on a daily basis. 
The first proposal of the concept was accepted by DM Division head thus the planning of 
the concept and its content was started. Plan and timetable for concept development was 
created together with the Director of HSE, DM Division North Americas and the first 
draft of the training concept was prepared.  
Since the concept was going to be targeted to plant’s General Managers and HSE man-
agers, also the content of the concept should be designed to meet the needs of both. Gen-
eral Managers usually use information about overall safety performance and info about 
the progress of the safety improvement projects while HSE managers may need more 
detailed training on how to actually improve safety in the facility. Because of the differ-
entiating needs, also the concept was to be separated to two different modules. The first 
module is targeted to General Managers and should include training on how to measure 
current safety performance, how to lead change and what type of programs General Man-
agers could implement to improve safety in their facilities. The second module, targeted 
to HSE managers should include information about their roles and responsibilities, chal-
lenges in improving safety culture and concrete actions and trainings HSE managers 
could use to improve safety in plant level.  
For both modules content development was started together with Director of HSE. To be 
able to design the concept to look as professional as possible, help from Learning and 
Development department of ABB was acquired. Learning&Development Consultant’s 
professional skills were used to create the design and appearance of the concept. With the 
help of the consultant presentations and training material templates were created as well 
as inter-company advertisement about the coming concept. For the concept’s training 
content training materials from previous case studies were collected and their possible 
use in the concept evaluated. Theoretical framework was taken into consideration when 
selecting the training materials.  
Pilot was designed to ensure that the concept requirements and construction design reach 
the objective to support the local business units in creating a true safety culture improve-
ment in their facilities. Together with the Director of HSE and Learning&Development 
Consultant a plan and timeline for the pilot was constructed. Since a cultural change in a 
facility is a long-term process that can last for years, the objective of the pilot was defined 
to only collect feedback from the participants on the concept itself. Since the concept 
builds on personal development as well as concrete tools the feedback for both should be 
acquired. The pilot was designed for both modules, first pilot was going to be arranged 
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to General Managers and the second for HSE managers.  Thus the needs of both managers 
could be taken into consideration and develop the concept further from their feedback.  
The feedback was going to be collected after each training session by providing the par-
ticipants the chance to freely comment the training content, how it was presented and 
whether the participants found it useful. From the discussions, notes should be taken and 
after the first pilot for General Managers, the improvement actions made according to the 
feedback. Also an overall evaluation of the concept should be gathered via anonymous 
questionnaire. For the evaluation of the feedback, the development team of the concept 
should meet and make modifications and improvements on the second pilot for HSE man-
agers. However, since the pilot content for General Managers and HSE managers differ, 
only applicable modifications should be made. After both modules has been piloted, the 
overall feedback should be evaluated and adjustments and improvements made for the 
whole concept. Also the concepts ability to adapt globally should be ensured. 
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4. RESULTS 
In this chapter first the results of the case studies are presented. The safety performance 
of Baldor and Phoenix is evaluated before and after the improvement projects. Also the 
actions and procedures taken in Baldor and Phoenix are presented. Later, the concepts 
final design is described and the content of the concept evaluated. The training materials’ 
success to meet the requirements of the concept is reviewed. Also the success of the con-
struction and the pilot is discussed.  
4.1 Case Baldor 
The safety performance of Baldor was measured during one year between November 
2013 and November 2014 prior the safety improvement project. Baldor, with 6 500 em-
ployees and 22 plants, had six serious injuries in this time period and 134 other recordable 
injuries, which was 74 more than predicted. 786 more Near misses and First aids were 
reported than expected, covering total of 1386 cases. Reported hazards of 9682 though 
surpass expectations with 3682 hazards. Safety observation tours were conducted in total 
2922 times. The Total Recordable Incident Frequency Rate (TRIFR), covering the Seri-
ous incidents, Restricted work day cases, Lost Time incidents, Medical Treatments and 
First Aids and calculated per 200 000 hours worked was 2,15. The Lost time performance 
rate was 0,154.  
Taking a longer time period to analyze the trend in TRIFR it is important to notice that 
the TRIFR has been decreasing already before November 2014 and therefore before the 
safety improvement project. The overall safety performance was getting better but still 
Baldor suffered from serious injuries. The Total Recordable Incident Frequency Rate, 
covering Serious incidents, Restricted work day cases, Lost Time incidents, Medical 
Treatments and First Aids was improving but the share of serious injuries was not de-
creasing. The trend was improving and going downwards until end of May 2014. In the 
summer 2014 the TRIFR started to increase and in November Baldor suffered again a 
serious incident. This was the turning point for developing new approach to improve the 
facilities’ safety performance. Baldor’s previous safety performance in TRIFR from Feb-
ruary 2012 until January 2015 is shown in Figure 17. 
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Baldor, with 6500 employees and 22 facilities, tried to improve its facilities safety per-
formance for several years but was not successful in eliminating the serious injuries. 
Therefore a new approach to tackle the safety issues was initiated. The execution started 
with gathering a committee of managers to plan and execute safety improvements. The 
management committee consisted of plant managers, directors, as well as managers from 
health and safety, environment, human resources, production and quality. The idea was 
to work non-stop for fourteen days and do a comprehensive investigation of the plant’s 
safety culture and identify and address the issues the plants were having. During the 14 
days, the plants were required to report on the progress of the safety improvements on a 
daily basis. After the 14 days, the plants had three months’ time to implement and com-
plete the required actions. The same procedure with management committee and the 14 
day process was executed in all Baldor’s 22 plants during the year 2014.  
Before the fortnight management execution phase, current reality check about the plants’ 
safety culture was made. The survey was conducted as a questionnaire for employees 
about their safety attitude. The survey consisted of twelve questions that were answered 
by “Agree” or “Disagree”. The questions were as follows: 
1. I am aware of Baldor’s 2015 health, safety and environmental initiatives 
2. We put safety first 
3. I am clear that my supervisor puts safety concerns first 
4. Our senior managers set the example in safety 
5. I am not asked to perform operations that are unsafe 
6. Our managers are concerned with our safety, not just safety numbers 
7. Our managers clearly communicate out safety goals 
Figure 17 Baldor's safety performance between Feb-12 and Jan-15 
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8. The safety discipline process is applied fairly and effectively 
9. Bringing up safety issues is OK in our culture 
10. We regularly check for safety hazards before accidents happen 
11. Our work environment is as safe as technology can make it 
12. I am comfortable reporting an accident, injury or near-miss to my supervisor 
The results from the questionnaire were collected and the percentage of the “Agree” an-
swers calculated. From these results, a three-color matrix was created that showed the 
results as green if over 90% has “Agreed”, yellow with “Agree” answers between 80-
89% and red if less than 80% has agreed. Only four plants of the 22 came up with good 
results, having no more than one question result in yellow. The other 18 plants were hav-
ing troubles with multiple areas as shown in Figure 18. The survey showed the urgency 
for safety culture change and the need for new safety improvements.  
 
Figure 18 Safety Survey 
After the safety survey, the safety performance of the 22 plants was evaluated. Number 
or Serious incidents, Total recordable incident frequency rate, Near miss and Hazard re-
porting and Safety observation tour performance was evaluated against the year 2014 
targets. Also the current status of Risk assessments were evaluated as well as the plant’s 
risk level that was based on the safety performance, level of proactive management ap-
proach, risk profile of the activities and plant’s audit results. From these results a “heat 
map” was created that showed the current performance status of plants. This three-color 
matrix is also later referred as heat map and is shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 Heat map of safety performance 
A Plan for tackling the safety issues was created within the management committee.  This 
plan consisted of seven different projects that were designed and launched during these 
14 days. These projects were small group meetings, span of control, safety audits, non-
standard work, compliance, training and safety competence. The progress of these pro-
jects was also followed with the heat-map previously presented. The idea of small group 
meetings was to enhance the information flow and communication from the management 
committee all the way to the shop floor.  The small groups helped to execute the required 
actions and improvement projects.  
Span of control refers to the number of subordinates that a manager or supervisor can 
directly control. This number varies with the type of work; if the work is complex or 
variable it reduces the number of subordinates supervisor can control, whereas in routine 
work the number of subordinates can be greater. In Baldor’s case the management com-
mittee evaluated every supervisors’ span of control and found out that the subordinates 
were not evenly distributed to supervisors. A new structure was planned, where the su-
pervisors had an equal number of subordinates depending on the type of work they were 
performing. The span of control was also balanced between plants which enabled a clear 
communication of the coming safety improvement projects.  
Safety audits were also started. Staff group walks were performed aiming to identify and 
remove as many safety issues and hazards as they could prior to the management audit. 
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The management committee performed the audits in their plants during the first ten days 
of the fortnight. The safety audits included also quality- and operations audits that further 
highlighted the issues that the plant was having. After the ten days of auditing, the results 
were summarized and action plan created to remove and mitigate the safety issues. At the 
same time supervisors were trained to identify the non-standard work in their work envi-
ronment. Daily self-audits were performed and first steps for implementing “Stop Take 
5” taken. Stop Take 5 is a process that identifies hazards prior to starting task, based on 
the principle of thinking before you act. This process was seen as one key element in 
reducing the risk in non-standard work. 
The next project was to evaluate the safety, health and security compliance of the plants. 
This was done with a compliance audit questionnaire that evaluated the plant’s safety 
program, management procedures, facilities and work procedures. It also took into ac-
count the hazardous substances, the PPE and the machinery that were used in the plant. 
The results and issues were communicated both to employees and managers and improve-
ment plans were made. The objective was to forge every plant 100% compliant with this 
audit in three months’ time. This required a lot of training and re-evaluation of many work 
procedures. First, Managers were trained for Incident Learning Process. The objective of 
this process is to identify and describe the true course of events that lead to the incident, 
to identify the root causes and contributing factors and to identify the risk reducing 
measures in order to prevent future accidents. After the training the managers were asked 
to go through every recordable incident that has happened in their plant in that one year 
time period. Managers had to make a throughout investigation of the root causes of inci-
dents and implement measures to prevent the incidents to happen again. 
Subsequently, perhaps the most profound, most important and most difficult change was 
made when supervisors’ and managers’ competence was re-evaluated and organizational 
structures adjusted to apply to the new safety organization.  The job-descriptions were 
reviewed and redesigned. The new competencies that supervisors and managers should 
have in order to truly have a safety-first management approach in the plants were defined. 
Previously managers could have had multiple areas they were responsible of e.g. engi-
neering, health and safety and environment. Now, in the new safety organization the man-
agers would only be responsible of one sector, enabling the focus to be full-time on one 
management area. After the re-design of the job-descriptions, every supervisor and man-
ager was interviewed and their competence evaluated against the new requirements. The 
persons were offered training to reach the new requirements but if the competence was 
too far from the new job-description the person was moved to another position.  By re-
designing the organizational structures and job-descriptions, Baldor was able to uniform 
the management approaches and improve communication, implementation and safety in 
the plants. 
To ensure that the new safety approach would also institutionalize in the culture, Baldor 
created a set of rules; the “Cardinal rules” and the “10 Things I always do and never do”. 
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The Cardinal rules are zero tolerance rules since a violation could result in a fatality or 
serious injury. Employees violating these rules were subject to immediate disciplinary 
measures and even termination. The Cardinal rules involve instructions on electrical 
safety, control of hazardous energy, working at height, confined space, machine guarding 
and load lifting. “10 Things I always do and never do” was a set of rules that enhanced 
good processes, management practices and habits that concerned safety. The plants also 
launched a “SafeStart” program after they had finished the previous safety improvement 
projects and actions in the heat-map by the end of the year 2014. SafeStart is a Canadian 
consulting service of workplace safety. The consultants train managers to become stake-
holders of the process and helps them to implement the program in their organization.  
The objective of the program is to improve peoples’ safety awareness and personal safety 
skills both at work and in free time. The program therefore focuses on human factors that 
are involved in the majority of incidents and injuries. In Baldor’s case, the program was 
used to further develop the safety performance and genuinely implement the safety-first 
idea to the organization. 
After the 14 days of management committee’s work and three months’ execution time 
the plants had time to implement the changes by the end of the year 2014. Follow-up 
study about the results of the program was made between December 2014 and July 2015. 
The safety performance of Baldor, with 6500 employees and 22 plants, was measured and 
significant improvements were shown. In the 7 months study period, Baldor had only one 
serious incident and 48 other recordable injuries. Near misses and First aids were reported 
total of 886 cases. Hazards were reported 15 700, and Safety observations tours were 
conducted 6717 times. The Total Recordable Incident Frequency rate, covering the Seri-
ous incidents, Restricted work day cases, Lost Time incidents, Medical Treatments and 
First Aids was 1,15. The past performance and the results are seen in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20 Baldor's safety performance before and after safety program 
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The results show major improvements in safety performance. However, since the study 
period of 7 months is quite short compared to the actual speed of safety culture transfor-
mation, no final conclusion of the success of the improvement project can be made. There 
are many different variables affecting to the total safety performance e.g. deviations in 
production capacity and number of employees so further analysis would be required. 
However, the TRIFR had an decrease of 46% thus the TRIFR target of 1,5 was reached 
and improved after the safety initiative. The reduction in Near misses and First aids was 
36%, and an increase in Hazard reporting performance of 62%. Further study of the long-
term results of the safety initiative was made by measuring Baldor’s safety performance 
between February 2015 and 2016. The Total recordable incident rate has further de-
creased and reach a record of 1,03 shown in Figure 21. However, the high TRIFR in 
February 2015 is still a result from the high rate in summer 2014. Therefore the TRIFR 
trend shows major decline to February 2016. But taking into consideration the declining 
TRIFR trend from February 2012 it can be argued that the safety improvement project 
institutionalized the improvements already made before and further improved the safety 
performance of Baldor.  
 
The objective of the analysis of Case Baldor is to state the reasons behind the decrease in 
TRIFR and also find the good practices affecting to the safety performance. Since there 
is no reliable scientific way to prove that a certain procedure or action would directly 
affect the safety performance or safety culture, the analysis of good practices was made 
during the interviews.  According to the DM division HSE manager and the Director of 
HSE, DM Division North Americas the most important part of the safety improvement 
Figure 21 Baldor's safety performance between Feb-15 and Feb-16 
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project was the management commitment. The management commitment is also empha-
sized in the theoretical part of the study and therefore it can be stated to have an effect to 
the improved safety culture. Another key activities in Baldor’s case were the Safety sur-
vey that assessed the current situation of the safety culture, the plan for improvement 
actions, the Incident Learning process as well as the Heat map to ensure the follow-up of 
the improvement activities. These procedures have also an effect to the management com-
mitment and are therefore also included in the new safety culture transformation concept. 
SafeStart was seen to be crucial in the institutionalizing change and therefore it should 
also be included in the new concept. The other actions or procedures used in Baldor’s 
case can be presented in the new concept as an alternative approaches in improving the 
safety culture and actions that can also be included in the HSE strategic plan. The proce-
dures to be used in the new concept are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 Procedures from Case Baldor included in the new concept 
Included in the new concept  Provided as alternative actions to the 
HSE strategic plan 
Safety Survey Small group meetings 
Management committee Span of control 
HSE plan Safety audits 
Heat map Non-standard work 
Incident Learning process Compliance audit 
SafeStart Competence evaluation 
 Cardinal rules 
 10 things I always and never do 
4.2 Case Phoenix 
The safety performance of Phoenix plant was measured during one year between Novem-
ber 2013 and November 2014 prior the safety improvement project. Phoenix, with 300 
employees, had two serious injuries in this time period and 16 other recordable injuries. 
Near misses and First aids were reported in total 8 cases. No Hazards had been reported 
but Safety observation tours were conducted in total 54 times. The TRIFR, covering the 
Serious incidents, Restricted work day cases, Lost Time incidents, Medical Treatments 
and First Aids was 8,19. The Lost time performance was unknown. 
For Phoenix, the planned culture change was started by creating a realistic HSE strategic 
plan for the plant managers to follow, including actions that would start creating change. 
The goal was to work with management and provide support in the execution of the stra-
tegic plan to ensure they could resolve all the issues and barriers they might face. Together 
with the strategic actions to improve safety, the goal was also to “re-program” the safety 
mindset of the line managers. The program had three major steps; first the creation and 
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launch of HSE strategic plan, the competence evaluation of the line managers and last the 
deployment of SafeStart program. 
In the HSE strategic plan targets for Recordable injuries and lost time days was set, both 
having target zero by the end of the year 2015. The strategic plan included multiple new 
programs, processes and trainings that were to be launched and implemented by the end 
of the year 2014. First, to improve the visibility of the new safety programs, safety com-
munication boards were installed to show the safety performance, best practices and im-
provement projects that were on-going in the plant. The goal of these boards were also to 
motivate employees to communicate the safety issues and share ideas. The importance of 
safety was further stressed with the zero tolerance Cardinal rules, previously represented 
in Baldor. The safety training started amongst employees with safety orientation proce-
dure and ergonomic training. For managers, all operations managers including plant man-
ager, direct managers, engineering managers, plant supervisors, line supervisors and field 
service managers were required to complete in-house “Back to Basics” safety training. 
Managers were also trained to use the Incident Learning Process for all identified record-
able and serious injuries. The results from these investigations were to be tracked for 
system and safety improvements. For all field service managers and field service person-
nel general industry safety training was conducted as well as Electrical safety training.  
Competence evaluation for line managers was performed as in Baldor’s case. The job-
descriptions were reviewed and re-evaluated and the competence of the line managers 
and HSE manager was evaluated against the new requirements. Through this evaluation 
it was determined that the current HSE manager did not have the skills needed to create 
the culture change and therefore the HSE manager was let go and a new HSE manager 
was hired five months later. While in search for a new HSE manager the Country HSE 
manager supported the line manages in continuing the execution of the HSE strategic 
plan. Safety audits were conducted in the plant and current health and safety documenta-
tion reviewed. All of the audit findings had to be closed and work procedures and docu-
mentation updated to reach safety compliance. Also a plant wide focus on the top 5 haz-
ards associated with the Phoenix facility were identified, including electrical hazards, 
working at height, machine safe guarding, fire prevention and material handling. To mit-
igate and remove the risks, control systems were developed and implemented via training 
and safety improvement actions. To help to implement safety continuous improvement 
projects, a Safety council team was gathered and monthly meetings scheduled. Managers 
were also trained to use Safety Management of Change procedure when introducing sig-
nificant modifications to processes and procedures or when new products were introduced 
to the manufacturing. The aim of the Safety Management of Change procedure was to 
enhance the information flow about new changes and improve the planning and the exe-
cution of these changes. 
Collecting frustrations- the visual 6S program was also launched during that year. The 
objective of the 6S was to create and maintain safe, orderly, clean and efficient workplace 
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and to motivate employees to participate and give feedback. The plant was divided to 19 
zones and every zone had to report 4 frustrations per month. The findings were kept 
posted on the communication boards to enable employees and managers to correct the 
issues quickly. In the third quarter (2015) 428 frustrations were collected and 375 were 
closed reaching to 89% closure success. To further motivate people to identify the hazards 
and safety issues in their work environment, ABB Good catch program was launched. 
Every full time employee was required to identify 3 “Good catches” also known as haz-
ards that had to be corrected. Each Good catch was rewarded by 100 dollar gift certificates 
that were quarterly drawn. The safety improvements were tracked with management 
Safety observations tours which every manager had to conduct at least 2 per month. 
The HSE strategic plan also included major improvements in the area of environment and 
sustainability. Environmental audits were performed and environmental procedures eval-
uated. Key environmental reporting dates were set, guidance and reminders of company 
policy was provided and regulatory requirements assessed. The processes and products 
were also to be re-designed in accordance with the environmental and sustainability con-
siderations. The execution of the health, safety and environmental improvement projects 
and programs of the HSE strategic plan was on-going for eight months. The deployment 
of SafeStart program was only then announced, when the management team was con-
vinced that the culture was ready to receive the program. SafeStart steering committee 
was set up to plan and complete the training modules. All operations managers including 
plant manager, direct managers, engineering managers, plant supervisors, line supervisors 
and all facility employees were required to learn the SafeStart mythologies focusing on 
human factors that are involved in the majority of incidents and injuries. The first three 
training modules were completed in quarter 3 (2015). The processes, programs and train-
ings that were included in the HSE improvement program in Phoenix are summarized in 
Table 12. 
Table 12 Phoenix's HSE safety improvement programs and trainings 
Processes and programs  Trainings 
HSE strategic plan Employee Safety orientation 
Risk assessments Ergonomic guidance 
Safety audits “Back to basics”-safety training 
Health and safety document  
Reviews 
Incident Learning Process 
Environmental procedures Safety Management of Change 
6S –Collecting Frustrations Electrical safety training 
Good catch-program Machine safety training 
Safety observation tours Ladder safety training 
SafeStart Material handling 
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From these programs and trainings few was highlighted and included in the new concept. 
For Phoenix, the planned culture change was started by creating a realistic HSE strategic 
plan for the plant managers to follow, including actions that would start creating change. 
The goal to work with management and provide support in the execution of the strategic 
plan is an essential part of successful change initiative also highlighted in the theory. 
Therefore the HSE plan and the supportive organization should also be built in the new 
concept. I Phoenix’s case the goal was also to “re-program” the safety mindset of the line 
managers. Also according to the DM division HSE manager and the Director of HSE, 
DM Division North Americas the most important part of the safety improvement project 
was the management commitment. Personal commitment and mindset are the key issues 
when leaders speak about change and safety. Thus actions to harness the managers with 
right “safety broadcast” e.g. how they talk and act about safety should be underlined also 
in the new concept. One key element in successful change is the participation and en-
gagement of employees. Collecting employee frustrations –procedure was considered to 
be very successful in Phoenix. The success of this procedure was analyzed via interviews 
of the Safety champions and therefore validated. The frustrations can act as a leading 
indicators for managers about the performance in their facilities and therefore should be 
also presented as a useful procedure to launch also in their facilities. The other procedures 
and programs from Phoenix are presented in the new concept as examples for action that 
can be included in the HSE strategic plan.  
The safety performance results of Phoenix was measured after the implementation of the 
HSE improvement program between December 2014 and July 2015. The time period to 
analyze the success of the project is very short considering the speed of a genuine culture 
change. However, for Phoenix there is no data available for long-term TRIFR evaluation 
and therefore the safety performance improvements are presented in these “snapshots” 
seen in Figure 22. Notable is also that there are many different variables affecting to the 
total safety performance e.g. deviations in production capacity and number of employees 
so further analysis of the safety improvement would be required. 
 
Figure 22 Phoenix's safety performance before and after safety improvement project 
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Phoenix, with 300 employees, managed to reach the target of zero Serious injuries and 
had only two other Recordable injuries in the study period between December 2014 and 
July 2015. Near misses and First aids were reported 14 cases, which was 6 more than 
before the HSE improvement program. Hazards were reported total of 988, which was a 
major improvement since the past performance showed zero reported Hazards. Safety 
observation tours were conducted in total 411 times. TRIFR, covering the Serious inci-
dents, Restricted work day cases, Lost Time incidents, Medical Treatments and First Aids 
was dropped to 0,93 which was an decrease of 87%. The Lost time performance was zero. 
The safety performance improvements of Phoenix are shown in Figure 22. 
4.3 Safety culture transformation concept 
In this chapter first the requirements of the concept are evaluated, whether they meet the 
objective of the concept as well as fit in the theoretical framework. The content and its 
ability to reflect the theory and good practices from previous cases is also reviewed. Later 
on the final design of the concept is presented and the construction evaluated. Last, pilot 
results are introduced and their possible effect on the design and construction of the con-
cept discussed.   
The requirements of the concept was built according to the information provided in the 
theoretical framework as well as according to the good practices from previous safety 
improvement projects in Baldor and Phoenix. After selecting the good practices from 
previous cases, the analysis of possible gaps between the existing training materials and 
the requirements of the concept was done. By comparing the already existing training 
materials to the theoretical framework and later to the requirements of the concept, it was 
found that a few key themes were missing. Previous case studies didn’t provide infor-
mation or training materials about Safety leadership and therefore some additional con-
tent should be developed for the concept. Also to meet the requirements in safety culture 
part, some theoretical material should be designed to enhance the knowledge especially 
on how to assess and improve safety culture. Additional support and training for manage-
ment of change piece is also required to be able harness the managers with abilities to 
lead a successful change. For HSE managers some additional training on their roles and 
responsibilities in managing the change in safety culture should be provided. Additionally 
to ensure that they have the right skills and methods to analyze safety performance a 
training for data analysis should be incorporated to the training concept.  
The requirements of the concept take into consideration both theoretical knowledge and 
practical information. The aim of this concept was to provide support and tools for future 
Safety leaders to enable a sustainable Health, Safety and Environmental cultural improve-
ment in their facilities. To meet this objective the requirements state clearly what kind of 
trainings, processes or information the concept should provide to meet this objective. 
Therefore can be stated that the requirements meet the objective of the concept, the de-
mands stated in theory but also takes into consideration the findings from previous case 
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studies. Since the findings from case studies were collected via multiple interviews and 
validated also by the Director of HSE, Baldor NAM the concepts requirements can be 
considered as reliable and correct. The concepts requirements and results of the content 
design are shown in Figure 23. 
 
Concept content
Book on Safety Leadership
Reflection questions on book
General Management Model
Leadership broadcast
Safety Survey, Bradley Curve
Caradinal rules, SafeStart
Challenges in creating culture
Role as a HSE consultant
Risk assessment
Incident learning process
Safety and compliance audit
Statistical data analysis
Role in Change Management
Best practices in driving Change
MOC Form
Harvesting frustrations
HSE strategic plan
Safety compliance audit
Concept’s 
requirements
Training on management 
principles
Present process to evaluate 
OHSMS
Enhance transformational 
leadership, safety participation 
and safety compliance
Present process for safety 
culture assessment
and institutionalization
Provide support for change
Enhance employee participation
Adaptable globally
Training and procedures to 
plan, monitor and improve 
safety
Theoretical background
Safety management systems
     - Guidelines
     - Management principles
Safety Leadership
     - Leadership styles
     - Leadership and performance 
     - Leaders engagement
Safety culture
     - Assessment of safety culture
     - Models
Management of Change
     - Methods 
     - Resistance
     - National cultures
Measuring safety
     - OHSMS
     - Risk control systems
     - KPI’s
 
Figure 23 Concept content results 
Content of the concept was designed according to the requirements of the concept. The 
content reflects the theoretical framework of the study as well as the good practices col-
lected from previous case studies. For each training or process presented in the concept 
there can be found a reason from the theory or from the good practices. Especially the 
processes or programs acquired from the Baldor and Phoenix cases can be stated as prac-
tically adaptable since they are currently known and in use in ABB. The content built 
specifically to this concept can be further evaluated against the feedback from the pilot. 
Since the content derives from theory and good practices it can be argued that the content 
of the concept is reliable and useful when aiming to change and improve the safety lead-
ership and safety culture in the organization. 
The construction of the concept is described in Figure 24. The 12 Month culture transfor-
mation concept includes separate training modules for General Managers and HSE man-
agers and an execution phase. Important part of the construction is the sponsorship that 
extends from the first module to the execution phase. The role of the sponsor is to support 
and advice managers in their culture change. Each facility attending this concept has their 
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own sponsor to use as a guiding resource throughout the change but also a team of spon-
sors at their service. Sponsors not only support and give guidance but also make site visits 
to help the managers to concur barriers they might face on site. Sponsors are gathered 
from different professional areas e.g. quality, HSE, operations and production so that the 
support is as wide-ranging as possible. Sponsorship plays an important role in success of 
change stated in theory of management of change. Therefore it is also implemented in 
this concept to ensure that the managers have all the possibilities to create and execute 
this change. 
 
Figure 24 Construction of the concept 
 
Before managers participate in the training modules, they perform pre-work in their fa-
cilities. The idea of the pre-work is to gather information about the current situation of 
the safety performance in their facility. This works as a reality check to managers and 
also highlights the problems the facilities are having. With this information the managers 
already have an idea what kind of support and training they need from the concept before 
they participate to the training modules. The first module is for General Managers and 
includes training on leadership and culture change, provides tools to improve safety and 
supports drafting of the HSE strategic plan. After the training General Managers return 
to their plants with the drafted strategic plan and refines the plan with HSE and line man-
agers. General Managers also design a heat map that states the current situation and the 
desired state of safety performance. This heat map is also used to follow-up the progress 
of the actions as well as the improvements of the performance.   
The second module is designed for HSE managers. The module includes training on HSE 
culture and tools to improve it, introduces the challenges managers might face in this 
culture change and discusses the roles and responsibilities HSE managers have in this 
change. After the training HSE managers return to their plants and together with General 
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Managers finalize the HSE plan so that it meets the set targets. The HSE plan is then 
presented to the sponsors for approval. As approved the 11 month execution phase starts. 
HSE plan is launched and implementation of the improvement actions started. Important 
is to keep the follow-up up-to-date and implement also the corrective actions.  The con-
struction of the concept with training modules and one year sponsorship supports suc-
cessful change in safety culture. Many researches emphasized the importance of support 
and long-term actions in culture change and for this the concept provides practical solu-
tions. The final design of the concept for General Managers is presented in Figure 25 and 
for HSE Managers in Figure 26. 
In General Manager’s module the pre-program and Day 1 concentrates on the reality 
check of current safety performance and personal management commitment. The objec-
tive is to awake the interest of managers to make improvements both in safety perfor-
mance and personal level. The discussions about Safety Leadership provides the partici-
pants the opportunity to change views and ideas with others and therefore enhances the 
knowledge of leadership role. The leadership styles are presented together with the Gen-
eral management model to introduce the link between leadership and culture. Participants 
are given the chance to reflect the styles to their own behavior thus noticing gaps and 
improvement areas. This part of the module plays an important role, since the success of 
culture change depends on the leader’s ability to notice the need for change and under-
stand his role in it. 
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Figure 25 Module I for General Managers 
The second day of the module harnesses the managers with tools to improve the safety 
performance and culture in their facility. Incident learning process guides the managers 
to focus on the priority areas of safety and to evaluate the performance of their OHSMS. 
The Harvesting frustrations process helps the managers to improve safety participation 
and engagement of employees, which is a crucial part in successful change. Introduction 
to the manager role in change management provides the basis for HSE strategic develop-
ment and day 2 the tools that can be included in the HSE plan. For institutionalizing the 
change the module provides SafeStart program to be implemented in the facilities. This 
module for General Managers meets the requirements emphasized in the theory and case 
studies. After the training the managers have the knowledge on how to lead change, the 
tools to improve safety culture on their part and the support given by the sponsors. 
The module for HSE managers includes the same processes and trainings as in the Gen-
eral Managers module. However, the HSE managers also need more training on concrete 
actions to improve safety in plant level and more understanding of their roles in managing 
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change. Therefore some key element on creating safety culture and driving chance is in-
troduced. The HSE managers should redesign their role and concentrate more on intro-
ducing ideas and actions to improve safety rather than trying to execute everything by 
themselves. This shift in mindset is an important part of culture change thus it is also 
emphasized in safety culture theory. The tools introduced in this module are more detailed 
and focused on mastering the process and the data. This enables the HSE managers to 
monitor, plan and improve safety more efficiently. This also supports the HSE point of 
view in business and therefore facilitates more change. 
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Figure 26 Module II for HSE Managers 
4.4 Pilot results 
The pilot of the concept was arranged in North America, since the Baldor and Phoenix 
cases and their success were already familiar to the other facilities. Four facilities took 
part in the pilot of the first module for General Managers. Attending was the Plant man-
ager or General Manager from each facility but also some operations managers and HSE 
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directors. The feedback from 9 participating managers was collected via free interviews 
after training modules and with a questionnaire about the overall success of the concept 
after the last training module. The questionnaires were collected anonymously to secure 
the confidentiality of the participants.  
Day one was started with team building and introductions. This was important to be able 
to create an environment where people could share their thoughts and concerns safely and 
without detraction. Group discussions about leadership were found to be very useful and 
eye-opening. Also the analysis of the safety performance of their own facilities was done 
in open discussion which enabled the exchange of ideas why the results were as they were 
and what could be done to improve them. Working on culture using the General manage-
ment model was perceived as a very helpful approach to understand the connections be-
tween leadership, strategy, skills and culture. Starting with collecting the elements of a 
desired safety culture and constructing the needed OHSMS structure and leadership styles 
backwards to reach the desired culture was experienced as unparalleled and an effective 
new approach. The manager’s feedback was excellent; the training provided them a new 
viewpoint on how to approach such an abstract matter as culture in a concrete way. It also 
enabled them to generate ideas and actions how they could start improving their facility’s 
safety culture. They also perceived that this approach could also be useful in other areas 
like quality and operations, where improvement actions are needed. Day two provided 
the managers the tools to further enhance the safety performance in the facilities. Espe-
cially Harvesting employee frustrations-training was considered as an effective approach 
to enhance employee participation and engagement. The training also helped the manag-
ers to shift the mindset that hazards can only be concrete dangers to broader view that 
also includes mental states as possible hazards for employees. 
HSE strategic plan drafting on day two was experienced to be too sudden. Even though 
the pre-work conducted in the facilities was guided and the pre-analysis of the results 
already made, the strategic planning was difficult to start. There was some deviation be-
tween the facilities on how profound analysis they have made on the results of Safety 
survey and Risk assessments. This was directly reflected to the perceived difficulty of 
starting the HSE strategic planning. Also the three hours’ time slot was experienced too 
short. To be able to support the managers more on the HSE strategic planning, the pre-
analysis of the results should be harmonized. Thus everyone should have the same amount 
of support in conducting the surveys and Risk assessments. Also the current state analysis 
should highlight e.g. top three hazards in the facility and top five departments where in-
cidents happen, thus providing every facility a starting point for planning. The pre-work 
could be formed as a template with detailed questions to help the managers to concentrate 
on right topics. This would enable the managers to have a better overall view of their 
performance and areas where improvements should be made. The HSE plan could also 
be more effective to draft in pieces instead of in one timeslot. This could be executed by 
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providing some time after each training module for managers to write down ideas and 
actions that could be useful in their own strategic plan.  
The final questionnaire about the overall success of the concept was performed after the 
last training module. The questionnaires were collected anonymously to secure the con-
fidentiality of the participants. Following questions were stated: 
 Based on my experience, what would I rate the value of this development oppor-
tunity?  
 How likely are you to recommend the program to your colleagues?  
 What worked well in this workshop and how did I contribute to that? 
 What didn’t work well in this workshop and how did I contribute to that? 
 What have I learned about myself through this development experience? 
The overall feedback collected via questionnaires and interviews was excellent. Below 
presented the questionnaire results. The numbers correspond to the amount of participants 
agreeing on certain scale grade. 
Table 13 Pilot questionnaire results 
Question Results 
Based on my experience, 
what would I rate the value 
of this development oppor-
tunity? 
1 Not useful, 
Little value 
2 3 4 5 6 7 Very useful,  
Great value 
     3 5 
How likely you are to recom-
mend the program to your col-
leagues? 
1 Not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very likely 
        4 4 
What worked well in the 
workshop and how did I con-
tribute that? 
“The workshop was well planned with good vision of the objectives 
of this workshop” 
“The interactions and information sharing among the plants and core 
members” 
“Brainstorming the attributes of a strong safety culture and how lead-
ership behavior fits in” 
“Getting a start on a strong plan” 
“Defining desired culture, then backing into structure, management 
and strategy to create it” 
“Participating with the group to really analyze the difference between 
culture and structure” 
“Small group, better involvement, structured very well, good presen-
tation” 
“Input was required from everyone” 
“I was able to share experiences” 
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What didn’t work well in this 
workshop and how did I con-
tribute that? 
“Info on what it was about before starting” 
“Felt that there was not enough time/material/preparation for the 
strategy part” 
“First steps in developing strategy. It was difficult to follow the pro-
vided tool; time was cut short due to schedule. Walk through the ex-
ample would have helped” 
“We could have gotten a little further with our plan” 
“Everything went well” 
“Some plants had different survey feedback which allows more in-
sight into employee feedback” 
What have I learned about 
myself through this develop-
ment experience? 
“Need to ensure that the perception of my leadership matches what I 
believe, I am doing” 
“I have the right mind set but need to force myself to keep safety 
fresh and evolving” 
“I am more passionate about safety, more than I thought” 
“I am looking forward to getting back into plant level initiatives” 
“We have some good tools to explain; teach things that come natu-
rally” 
“To be more vocal to my directs about safety” 
“I learned about frustration can lead to accidents” 
“I need continue carrying the passion and work harder to improve 
safety, employee involvement is critical” 
“Reaffirmed the value of plant collaboration to share ideas and best 
practices” 
 
Every participant found the training concept very useful. The concept also met the expec-
tations the participants had. All of the participants would also recommend this program 
to their colleagues. This underlines the success of the training modules and good practical 
contribution of the concept. With minor changes in pre-work activities and strategic plan-
ning this concept could be further improved to meet the excellence also in the future. 
However, since a cultural change is an evolutionary process that can last years, the overall 
success of the concept in improving safety performance and culture in the facilities cannot 
be yet stated. Further evaluation of the progress of the facilities should be investigated in 
long-term. Even though the safety culture would improve it is still difficult to show sci-
entifically that it is only improved because of this transformation concept. However, tak-
ing into account the feedback the managers provided this concept can be a very potential 
way to improve the safety leadership competencies of managers. And since safety lead-
ership is the key to true safety culture transformation in the organization, the concept can 
provide the solution for sustainable Health, Safety and Environmental cultural change. 
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5.  DISCUSSION 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss and evaluate the validity of the work tasks and 
the validity of the resulting concept as well as evaluate the scientific and practical contri-
butions of this thesis. The concept was designed via three work tasks that would enable a 
reliable and successful concept for safety culture transformation. The work tasks consid-
ered both theoretical knowledge and practical inputs. Theoretical framework bench-
marked the field of scientific research and evaluated what should be taken into consider-
ation when talking about safety performance, safety culture and managing change. The 
theoretical framework built the base for the concept development but was not sufficient 
alone to validate the needed actions to create safety culture change. Therefore the practi-
cal knowledge of change initiatives and safety performance improvement was gathered 
from the previous safety improvement projects in ABB via interviews and database anal-
ysis.  
The DM division HSE manager and the Director of HSE, DM Division North Americas 
were interviewed about the safety improvement projects and information about the used 
procedures and executed actions in these projects was gathered. All the collected infor-
mation and final transcript was later reviewed and validated by the Director of HSE, Bal-
dor NAM. It can be argued that the persons interviewed about the previous safety im-
provement projects might not be the most objective ones since they were also participat-
ing in the execution. However, the validation by Director of HSE, Baldor NAM ensures 
that the described actions taken and feedback from employees participating in these pro-
jects were correct. These work tasks could have also included some more interviews from 
the shop floor level as well as from the executing management team but since the projects 
were performed in the US a couple of years ago, the identification of single procedures 
and their effect on safety culture would still have been hard to validate. 
The analysis of the safety performance improvements were done with database analysis. 
Long-term past performance of these facilities was not possible to analyze since there 
was no safety data available prior the acquisition by ABB. Past performance and the de-
velopment of e.g. TRIFR performance would have provided more solid arguments for the 
success of the safety improvement projects.  However, since a cultural change is an evo-
lutionary process that can last years, the overall success of the projects in improving safety 
performance and safety culture in the facilities cannot be stated. Further evaluation of the 
progress of the facilities should be investigated in long-term. However, even though the 
safety culture would improve it is still difficult to show scientifically that it is only im-
proved because of certain actions taken in the projects. Nonetheless, the analysis of the 
previous safety improvement projects provided good practices and procedures to be in-
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cluded in the concept. Together with the theoretical framework the good practices under-
lined some key issues that formed the requirements of the concept. Since the content of 
the concept was designed according to the requirements of the concept the method for 
concept design is validated.  
The scientific contribution of this thesis is most emphasized to the concrete concept that 
can be used to improve the safety culture. Until today, the research field does not provide 
a concrete concept for safety culture transformation but many theories and concepts con-
cerning different fields. There are many validated approaches for e.g. successful change 
but not one approach that combines the change initiative to safety performance or safety 
culture. However, to be able to validate the scientific contributions of this concept, more 
detailed analysis of the content of the concept and the success of the concept should be 
evaluated and tested also in other industries and scientific studies.  
The practical contribution of this thesis is easier to present and evaluate. ABB already 
had many procedures to improve safety performance but these procedures were discon-
nected and the overall picture on how to actually improve safety culture was missing. 
Analysis of the case studies not only provided ABB the information of the success of 
these projects but also a way to transfer the learning from these projects to a new, im-
proved concept. The new concept provides ABB the tool to enhance leadership compe-
tencies and harnesses the managers with concrete tools to improve safety performance 
and culture in their facilities. Taking into account the feedback managers provided in the 
first pilot this concept is showed to be a very potential way to improve the Safety leader-
ship competencies of managers. Since the management commitment and leadership plays 
the key role in managing change this concept can act as a successful way to institutional-
ize safe working practices to the facilities.  
For now the concept is divided to two modules, one for General managers and the other 
for HSE managers but can be later adapted e.g. according to Bradley curve if this con-
struct is found to be too heavy. With the Bradley curve- construct ABB could provide 
more allocated tools to facilities according to their current state of safety culture. For 
facilities that still have highly dependent culture, the concept could provide more concrete 
tools to improve safety while for interdependent cultures the concept could focus more 
on leadership competencies and employee engagement. The content of the concept can 
be further developed after the first facilities have participated in this concept. It is essen-
tial to collect more good practices and feedback from the participants since then ABB can 
transfer the learnings into continuous improvement. Next steps for ABB would be to val-
idate the success of this concept in safety culture transformation by analyzing the safety 
performance in long-term. Also the global adaptation and the challenges in modifying the 
concept to meet the cultural differences around the world should be further investigated. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this thesis was to provide a training concept for future Safety leaders and help 
them to enable a sustainable Health, Safety and Environmental cultural transformation of 
safety by choice and not by chance. The main goal of the concept was to develop Safety 
leadership competencies of line managers and create commitment, ownership and ac-
countability across the organization. ABB already had many procedures to improve safety 
performance but these procedures were disconnected and the overall picture on how to 
actually improve safety culture was missing. The new concept harnesses the managers 
with tools to improve the safety performance and safety culture of their facilities and 
provides information and support for leading successful change.  
The concept was built on theoretical framework and case studies. The theoretical frame-
work introduced theories of Safety culture, Safety Leadership and Management of 
Change but also tools to measure and analyze safety performance. Analysis of the case 
studies not only provided ABB the information of the success of the previous safety im-
provement projects but also a way to transfer the learning from these projects to a new, 
improved concept. The concept was constructed to two modules for General Managers 
and HSE managers. The first module for General Managers included training on leader-
ship and culture change, provided tools to improve safety and supported drafting of the 
HSE strategic plan. The second module for HSE managers included training on HSE cul-
ture and tools to improve it, introduced the challenges managers might face in the culture 
change and discussed the roles and responsibilities of HSE managers in the change.  
The overall feedback collected from the participants of first pilot was excellent. Every 
participant found the training concept very useful. The concept also met the expectations 
the participants had. All of the participants would also recommend the program to their 
colleagues. This underlines the success of the training modules and good practical con-
tribution of the concept. With minor improvements in pre-work activities and strategic 
planning-module this concept could be further improved to meet the excellence also in 
the future. However, since a cultural change is an evolutionary process that can last years, 
the overall success of the concept in improving safety performance and safety culture in 
the facilities cannot be yet stated. Further evaluation of the progress of the facilities should 
be investigated in long-term. However, even though the safety culture would improve it 
is still difficult to show scientifically that it is only improved because of this transfor-
mation concept. Nonetheless, taking into account the feedback the managers provided 
this concept can be a very potential way to improve the Safety leadership competencies 
of managers. And since Safety leadership is the key to true safety culture transformation 
in the organization, the concept can provide the solution for sustainable Health, Safety 
and Environmental cultural change in the organization. 
80 
In the future the construct of this concept could be adapted e.g. according to Bradley curve 
if this construct is found to be too heavy. With the Bradley curve- construct ABB could 
provide more allocated tools to facilities according to their current state of safety culture. 
For facilities that still have highly dependent culture, the concept could provide more 
concrete tools to improve safety while for interdependent cultures the concept could focus 
more on leadership competencies and employee engagement. The content of the concept 
can be further developed after the first facilities have participated in this concept. It is 
essential to collect more good practices and feedback from the participants since then 
ABB can transfer the learnings into continuous improvement. Next steps for ABB would 
be to validate the success of this concept in safety culture transformation by analyzing the 
safety performance in long-term. Also the global adaptation and the challenges in modi-
fying the concept to meet the cultural differences around the world should be further in-
vestigated. 
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